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4.4  |  The search for WMD
693.  In a speech in Washington on 11 February, President Bush highlighted recent
counter-proliferation successes, including the breaking of the AQ Khan nuclear
proliferation network and Libya’s agreement to end its nuclear and chemical weapons
programmes, and announced a package of proposals to strengthen international
counter-proliferation efforts.386
694.  On 13 February, the British Embassy Washington reported that, although
President Bush’s “big pitch on proliferation” had had some success in broadening the
political debate about WMD, a poll in The Washington Post suggested that a majority
of Americans believed the President had intentionally exaggerated evidence that Iraq
had WMD.387
695.  The Embassy also reported that the Senate Intelligence Committee had decided
to broaden its investigation, previously restricted to the performance of the intelligence
community, to include whether policy-makers’ statements were substantiated by
intelligence.388 The Embassy concluded that the way was probably now clear for the
Committee to release a report at the end of March which criticised the intelligence
community.
696.  The Embassy also reported that:
The CIA had released an internal speech by Ms Miscik to The Washington
Post, which had reported on 12 February that “an internal review revealed
several occasions when analysts mistakenly believed that Iraq weapons data
had been confirmed by multiple sources when in fact it had come from a single
source” and that Mr Tenet had “ordered an end to the long-standing practice of
withholding from analysts details about the clandestine agents who provide the
information”.
The New York Times on 13 February had quoted “senior intelligence officials”
as saying that analysts had not been told that much of the information came
from defectors linked to exile organisations that were promoting an American
invasion.
Newsweek had reported on 12 February that the CIA was “re-examining the
credibility of four Iraq defectors” and had already “acknowledged that one of the
defectors had been previously branded a fabricator by another US intelligence
agency”.
386  The White House, 11 February 2004, President Announces New Measure to Counter the Threat
of WMD.
387  Telegram 220 Washington to FCO London, 13 February 2004, ‘Iraq WMD: US Debate, 13 February’.
388  The Intelligence Committee’s first report was published on 9 July 2004. The “Phase II” report on the
broader investigation announced in February 2004 was published in five parts between September 2006
and May 2008. Both are addressed later in this Section.
561
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