6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
available
for Phase IV operations in the UK AO, which “may impact on our
ability
to produce
exemplary early effect during Phase IV”.
755.
Lt Gen Reith
concluded:
“US
commanders are likely to press on branch planning and UK land
contributions
beyond the
provisions of the Base Plan.
“The
situation is changing: the potential for a UK box remains my
aspiration but
is in practical
terms receding …
“In
discussing the campaign, and subject to their [the Chiefs of Staff]
agreement,
CJO will
balance the desire to husband our land forces for Phase IV in our
own
AO, against
the possible Coalition requirement to take a greater part of the
Phase
III effort,
with the risks this implies in terms of the ease with which we
transition to
Phase
IV.”
756.
The Chiefs of
Staff discussed the papers on 5 March.329
They rejected
the proposal
for a UK
box.
757.
In Lt Gen
Reith’s absence, Maj Gen Fry sought guidance from the Chiefs of
Staff
on offering
“UK ‘niche’ contributions beyond the provisions of the Base Plan”
in the
context of
the requirement to deliver an exemplary Phase IV.
758.
The Chiefs of
Staff noted that delivering an exemplary Phase IV required
“the
concomitant
resources and OGD [other government department]
commitment”.
Adm Boyce
stressed that Phase IV could not be delivered by military activity
alone.
759.
Adm Boyce
directed Lt Gen Reith to “push for a ‘niche’ role for the UK …
and
make it
clear that the UK was ready to be asked to contribute further in
order to exploit
any
operational opportunities that arose during the campaign”, subject
to US logistics
support and
assurances that UK forces would be “relieved-in-place” as soon as
possible
for Phase
IV activities in the South.
760.
Mr Watkins
informed Sir David Manning on 6 March that Mr Hoon and the
Chiefs
of Staff
judged that “it would not be wise at this late stage to seek a
major revision to the
US plan”,
but that the plan could make better use of some of the niche
capabilities in
1 (UK)
Division.330
Mr Hoon
had agreed that the UK should encourage US commanders
to identify
a niche role. The US was looking at a number of variations to its
plan,
including
involving 7 Armoured Brigade in “decisive manoeuvre operations
beyond
south-eastern
Iraq” and “possibly in a decisive phase around Baghdad”. That
would
raise a
number of issues, including for post-conflict
operations.
329
Minutes, 5
March 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
330
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Options for Employment of
UK Land Forces’.
447