3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
took the
same view of the Iraqi behaviour up to … the end of January – that
they
927.
Asked by the
Inquiry whether a 2006 report in the New York
Times, that
President
Bush had
said at the meeting that the Americans would put the work behind
the effort
but, if it
ultimately failed, military action would follow anyway, was
correct, Mr Blair
responded:
“The
President’s view was that if you can’t get a second resolution
because, in
essence
France and Russia are going to say no, even though … I don’t think
they
were really
disputing that Iraq was in breach of resolution 1441, then we were
going
to be faced
with a choice I never wanted to be faced with: did you go without
a
928.
Asked if his
position had been that he would take military action with the US if
a
second
resolution could not be agreed, Mr Blair replied that “all
sorts of factors would
be in
play”, including the legal question and whether there would be
political support.
But, in the
context of an Iraqi breach, Mr Blair was:
“… under
absolutely no doubt … that, if you backed away, when he was
playing
around with
the inspectors in precisely the way he had done before, then you
were
going to
send a very, very bad signal.”303
929.
Asked if his
recollection was that the proposed start date for military
action
discussed
at that meeting was 10 March, Mr Blair replied: “It was at
that meeting
or around
about that time, certainly, yes.”304
930.
In his memoir
Mr Blair wrote that with the New Year there was a sense of
being
“in the
final phase”: “The first Blix report in mid‑January was clear:
Saddam was not
complying.”
Resolution 1441:
“… had been
silent on the need for a further resolution prior to any military
action.
There were
legal debates as to whether it was necessary, and Peter Goldsmith
was
again
anxious about it. The Russians had become negative, and it was
perfectly
possible
that a second resolution might be vetoed.
“I was
still thinking it might be possible to get a second resolution –
George
[President
Bush] was adamant he didn’t need one. Jack Straw and
others
warned me
that, without one, I might be unable to survive the expected
House
of Commons vote.
“I was
about as isolated as it is possible to be in politics. On the one
hand, the US
were
chafing at the bit and essentially I agreed with their basic
thrust. Saddam was
301
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, pages 97‑98.
302
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 98.
303
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 99.
304
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 100.
169