9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
“There has
been fighting in Karbala between [Muqtada] al-Sadr’s supporters
and
rival Shia
militias, probably allied to Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani.”266
470.
On the same
day, at the request of the FCO, the JIC issued an Assessment
of
the areas
that Sunni Islamist terrorists were using or were likely to use as
bases to
coalesce,
recruit, train and plan attacks in safety.267
It also
considered the circumstances
that
terrorists might exploit in order to operate in this
way.
“Iraq has
already attracted significant numbers of mujahedin seeking jihad.
It is
possible
that, if the security situation worsens, these mujahedin will be
able to
coalesce
into relatively large groups in areas where the population is
sympathetic
to their
causes, and where they can establish small training facilities and
can
co‑ordinate
terrorist activity both inside, and outside, Iraq.”
472.
The JIC judged
that some countries currently regarded as safe locations
by
Islamist
terrorists would continue to improve their counter terrorism
efforts, but that:
“… without
significant Western support, others (eg … Iraq) will be unable to
prevent
terrorists
establishing a presence.”
473.
At this point
in October 2003, the MOD’s planning assumptions were:
“… [a] UK
military presence in SE Iraq until at least the end of March 2006,
at up
to a 2-star
HQ, a medium scale land contribution, and small scale naval and
air
contributions
…There are many variables whose effect on the outcome is
very
difficult
to predict.”268
474.
Those
variables were:
•
a
stabilised security situation, with a functioning Iraqi criminal
justice system;
•
an Iraqi
Government able to provide essential services; and
•
the
timetable for elections and the transfer of
sovereignty.
475.
On 16 October,
Mr Hoon reported to Cabinet that there were increased attacks
on
Coalition
Forces across Iraq as a whole, though there was a steady
improvement in the
security
situation in the South.269
He believed
Coalition Forces responding to attacks in
the Sunni
triangle were alienating Iraqi opinion, thereby reducing
consent.
266
JIC
Assessment, 15 October 2003, ‘Iraq Security’.
267
JIC
Assessment, 15 October 2003, ‘International Terrorism: Bases for
Sunni Islamist Terrorists”.
268
Minute Lee
to Finance Director [MOD], 15 October 2003, ‘Op TELIC Planning
Assumptions’.
269
Cabinet
Conclusions, 16 October 2003.
285