15.1 | Civilian
personnel
explained
that a posting to Iraq would not be counted as one of the maximum
of two
overseas
postings usually allowed by the FCO before staff had to return to
London.
596.
The Golden
Ticket policy remained unchanged in 2005.391
597.
An official
from the FCO HR Directorate told Mr Asquith in June 2006 that
staff
in Basra
had asked whether the Golden Ticket really meant
anything.392
The
official
had
explained to staff that the ticket was not a guarantee of a dream
posting but
“an added extra”.
It was important that staff obtained timely, good quality
appraisals
of their
performance in Iraq to support job applications.
598.
The Golden
Ticket was still on offer in January 2008, with an additional
caveat:
“You will
be able to ‘cash in’ your ticket when you next bid for jobs. A
Golden Ticket
will give
your bid priority over other officers’ bids provided
you are considered
equally
credible in the job in other respects.” 393
599.
In August
2008, an official in the FCO Human Resources Directorate
informed
DFID that
although the Golden Ticket had not been abolished formally, “we
recognise
that it is
increasingly difficult to deliver and the staff in post also
recognise this”.394
600.
Participants
at the Inquiry’s civilian outreach event who had been posted to
Iraq
during the
CPA period commented that some people had been “pressured” to
volunteer
for tours
in Iraq with the offer of a Golden Ticket, but nobody knew of
anyone rewarded
with a
favourable posting on their return. Some said they had not had jobs
held open for
them during
their absence because of cost‑saving pressures.
601.
Members of the
group also commented that many in their home departments
did
not want to
hear about their experiences on return from Iraq because of the
negative
perceptions
of the conflict in departments and the wider public.
602.
Participants
who served in Iraq from mid‑2004 to mid‑2007 said that the
career
impact of a
posting to Iraq was often more negative than positive. There was
a
perception
that human resources departments did not recognise adequately the
skills
acquired
and that the career benefits had been oversold during recruitment.
Some
returnees
felt their departments saw them as something of a problem. The MOD
was
a notable
exception, where skills had been recognised and there had been a
positive
career
impact.
603.
Some non‑MOD
participants also commented that performance in jobs
following
an Iraq
posting was often poor. Possible contributory factors included low
motivation and
lack of
understanding by subsequent managers of what staff had been
through.
391
Paper
[unattributed], 25 November 2005, ‘Terms and Conditions: Temporary
Duties to Iraq’.
392
Minute [FCO
junior official] to Asquith, 4 July 2006, ‘Visit by HR Manager to
Basra 14‑19 June 2006’.
393
Paper FCO,
January 2008, ‘Terms, Conditions and Allowances in
Iraq’.
394
Email FCO
[junior official] to FCO [junior official], 8 August 2008, ‘Think
piece on post‑Iraq jobs’.
349