9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
732.
Mr Blair’s
Assistant Private Secretary advised him to argue for maintaining
the end
of June
deadline in his conversation with President Bush,
because:
“We think
that a postponement will damage our credibility (looking as though
we
intended to
stay on indefinitely); the UN won’t engage before the end of
‘occupation’;
we risk
deterioration in security if the US/UK remain as the primary
targets;
and the
Iraqi political vacuum will continue until we force the Iraqis to
face up
to real
responsibility.”397
733.
Sir Nigel
raised the possibility of a further resolution with Dr Rice on 9
February at
which point
she was not in favour.398
He recorded
that “her key point was that we should
do nothing
to undermine the value of UNSCR 1511”.
734.
In his
conversation with President Bush on 10 February, Mr Blair said
that it was
vital the
30 June deadline held firm.399
735.
The Cabinet
Office’s Annotated Agenda for the meeting of the AHMGIR
on
12 February
stated that the US position that there was no need for a Security
Agreement
with Iraq
post-transition had hardened but no final decisions had yet been
taken in
Washington.400
Ministers
were advised that it was worth seeking to influence the US
by
pressing
the political and military drawbacks, rather than the legal
objectives.
736.
Work to draft
the TAL continued towards the deadline for publication
on
737.
Drafting
progress was slowed in early 2004 by a combination of the Eid
holiday, the
distraction
of a visit by Mr Brahimi and his team, and ongoing discussion
of the issues
surrounding
Kurdish federalism.402
738.
Mr Brahimi
and a UN team had visited Iraq for ten days in early February.
Cabinet
Office
officials briefed the AHMGIR that:
“Brahimi’s
early contacts with Bremer and Greenstock suggest UN doubts
about
elections
and the caucus process prior to 30 June with a preference for
Afghanistan
models
(e.g. a national conference or national government of
technocrats).”
739.
Cabinet Office
officials observed that with that model “we would still face
the
problem of
how to select the representatives of a national conference or
government”.
397
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 10 February 2004, ‘Video-conference with
Bush, 10 February’.
398
Letter
Sheinwald to Adams, 9 February 2004, ‘Iraq’.
399
Letter
Cannon to Adams, 10 February 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s
video-conference with President Bush,
10
February’.
400 Annotated
Agenda, 12 February 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
401 Annotated
Agenda, 26 February 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
402 Annotated
Agenda, 12 February 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
327