3.8 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 8 to 20 March
2003
for
military action against Iraq. There would be a substantive motion
in a debate now
scheduled
for Tuesday [18 March].”
804.
Lord Goldsmith
told Cabinet that he had answered a Parliamentary Question
in
the House
of Lords that day “on the authority for the use of force against
Iraq”; and that
Mr Straw
had also sent a document “on the legal basis” to the
FAC.
805.
The minutes
record that Lord Goldsmith informed Cabinet that:
“Authority
existed from the combined effect of United Nations Security
Council
resolutions
678, 687 and 1441, all of which were adopted under Chapter VII of
the
United
Nations Charter. The latter allowed the use of force for the
express purpose
of
restoring international peace and security … resolution 1441
determined that
Iraq had
been and remained in material breach of … resolution 687 and gave
Iraq
a final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations, warning of
serious
consequences
if it did not do so. It was plain that Iraq had failed so to comply
and
therefore
continued to be in material breach. The authority to use force
under
…
resolution 678 was revived as a result … [R]esolution 1441 did not
contain
a requirement
for a further … resolution to authorise the use of
force.”
806.
The points
made during discussion included:
•
the
attitude of France “had undermined the mechanism of the United
Nations
to enforce
the will of the international community”;
•
with the
removal of a tyrant and the new initiative on the MEPP, “a
different
Middle East
was in prospect”;
•
“after the
strenuous efforts to find a diplomatic solution”, the Government
“had
enhanced
its credibility by the integrity and consistency of its position on
Iraq”;
•
the
Government’s supporters “needed a comprehensive statement to
explain
the
position”: a second resolution “had been politically desirable but
not
legally essential”;
•
“it was
important to focus on Saddam’s failure to comply, and to avoid
the
impression
that the failure to gain a further … resolution was the
issue”;
•
within the
UK the views of all citizens had to be respected and a dialogue
with
the Muslim
community maintained, “while setting out clearly the case for
military
action in
the current circumstances”;
•
failure to
disarm Iraq “risked sending a message of encouragement to
dictators
and
countries illegally holding weapons of mass
destruction”;
•
in
conducting military operations, it would be important to show “we
wished to
protect
civilians, seek the surrender of Iraqi conscripts, and protect
religious and
cultural
sites”;
•
the
Government’s commitment to the UN was to make “its writ run” and
to
encourage
its members to work within that framework;
541