The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
945.
The
uncertainties about the US timetable for military action, including
the
impact of
the timetable for inspections following adoption of a UN
resolution,
made it
hard to identify a precise date by when decisions on preparations
would
have had to
have been taken.
946.
The MOD
was, however, anxious about the need to make timely
preparations
to equip,
train and deploy the agreed force package if it was to keep the
option of
a land
contribution on the table.
947.
Package 3
in October 2002 was based on a square armoured brigade,
which
constituted
only a medium scale capability, but the deployment of a
divisional
headquarters
and the demands of the northern option for logistic
support
increased
the number of personnel it was estimated would be required to a
total
of 28,000,
including 7,700 Reserves.
948.
Lt Gen Pigott
had advised Mr Hoon on 24 May that three months’ warning
would
be needed
to deploy a medium scale joint force, and six months’ warning would
be
needed to
deploy a large scale war‑fighting land force. The latter would be
better
prepared
and carry fewer risks if nine months warning was
available.
949.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry:
“… if
politicians wanted certain options, you had to have enough time
to
950.
In the event,
as Section 6.2 shows, the size and shape of the UK
contribution
changed
very significantly in January when the decision was made to deploy
for
operations
in southern Iraq. The roles for two of the three UK brigades were
not decided
until March
2003.
951.
The
Government’s stated objective was to keep the option of a
significant UK
land
contribution open.
952.
In the
MOD’s advice to Mr Hoon, and in his advice to Mr Blair, a
range of
arguments
were set out of differing weight and significance in support of
the
MOD
position that a decision was needed in October 2002 to offer
significant
ground
forces to the US for planning purposes on the same basis as the
forces in
Package 2
if the UK was to have a significant role in ground combat
operations.
953.
The timing
of the decision on 31 October to offer ground forces to
the
US on the
same basis as Package 2 appears to have been driven primarily
by
the MOD
advice of 29 October that the option of UK participation in
ground
operations
through Turkey was at risk of being excluded from
CENTCOM’s
375
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 49.
318