3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
said the
real ultimatum would be made just before action when we tell Saddam
to get
699.
In his press
conference with Mr Berlusconi on 21 February, Mr Blair
warned that
military
action on Iraq could not be avoided unless Saddam Hussein chose
“the route of
peaceful
disarmament”.201
Mr Blair
emphasised that no one wanted war. That was why:
“… last
summer, instead of starting a war, we went to the UN …
“But there
is a moral dimension to this question too. If we fail to disarm
Saddam
peacefully,
then where does that leave the authority of the UN?
“And if we
leave Saddam in charge of Iraq with his weapons of mass
destruction,
where does
that leave the Iraqi people who are the principal victims of
Saddam?”
700.
Asked about
the opposition to conflict expressed by church leaders,
Mr Blair
replied:
“I don’t
pretend to have a monopoly of wisdom … and I totally understand
why
people
don’t want war …
“That’s the
very reason why we have given every single opportunity for
this
to be resolved
peacefully. All I ask people to do is understand that
however
sincerely they
hold their view, I hold my view sincerely too. And there is
another
side to
this argument.
“I
understand exactly why people feel so strongly, but in the end, I
have got to make
a decision
and that’s the difference between leadership and
commentary.
“I have got
to make a decision. If we cannot disarm him peacefully, are we just
going
to ignore
the issue and hope it will go away?”
701.
Late that
evening, there was a conference call, including
Dr Rice,
Mr Stephen
Hadley (US Deputy National Security Advisor), Sir David Manning
and
Mr Powell
as well as Mr Campbell.202
The US was
worried about the text, which
included “a
side statement directly challenging Saddam”. In his diaries,
Mr Campbell
wrote that
Dr Rice:
“… feared
that setting it out as a final chance – again – or a challenge to
Saddam,
suggested
there was something here beyond 1441. She said 1441 was all that
we
needed. We
tried to use the call to get over the need for a different sort of
language
on this,
but they really didn’t get it.”
200
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of
Power:
Countdown to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
201
The
Guardian, 21
February 2003, Blair: war
difficult to avoid.
202
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of
Power:
Countdown to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
303