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6.4  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003
183.  Mr Hoon commissioned work from MOD officials on military options, to be
conducted “on very close hold”.
184.  Limited Whitehall co-ordination took place in the MOD-based Pigott Group.
185.  In the absence of direction from No.10 after Crawford:
the FCO was effectively sidelined from planning and preparation for
possible military action in Iraq at a stage when policy remained fluid and
FCO views on strategic direction might have been expected to have most
influence;
UK military planning dominated Whitehall consideration of Iraq, with
the consequence that any potential UK involvement was considered
principally in terms of the military role;
DFID expertise on post-conflict issues was excluded from discussion as
strategy took shape;
the systematic research and analysis of post-conflict issues that was
needed to underpin UK policy was not commissioned; and
Mr Blair sought to influence US thinking on post-conflict issues with
only a broad concept of the post-conflict task and no clearly defined UK
negotiating position.
186.  Many of the failings in UK planning and preparation over the coming year
stemmed from those developments.
187.  Mr Blair discussed Iraq with President Bush at Crawford, Texas, on 6 April. The
discussions are addressed in more detail in Section 3.2.
188.  A three-page record of the discussions on Iraq was circulated on a secret and
strictly personal basis by Sir David Manning.112 Sir David recorded that, among other
issues, Mr Blair and President Bush had discussed who might replace Saddam Hussein
if action were taken to topple him.
189.  Mr Powell told the Inquiry:
“… one of the things that is so interesting is that the Prime Minister was talking at
that stage about the things that you would need to do to make this successful … He
talked about what would happen on the day after. If you go into Iraq, are you going
to be prepared for what happens thereafter? So I think he in many ways listed all the
right questions at that stage when he was talking to Bush at Crawford.”113
112  Letter Manning to McDonald, 8 April 2002, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to the United States: 5-7 April’.
113  Public hearing, 18 January 2010, page 26.
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