9.6 |
27 June 2007 to April 2008
827.
Mr Browne’s
Private Secretary commented that this “presumably shows that
JAM
want the
South for themselves and see us as yesterday’s news and the ISF as
the real
threat to
their hegemony”.403
828.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner reported that at the MNF-I Commanders Conference
on
23
February, Gen Petraeus had been upbeat about progress across
Iraq.404
While
Mosul
and the
North remained the focus, combating Shia militias and Iranian
influence were
the
long-term challenges. For MND(SE), this would mean an increase in
US attention on
the South,
particularly the borders with Iran in Maysan.
829.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner reported that US planning for drawdown was
progressing
at great
speed, and the redrawing of command boundaries would form part of
this
work. While
he believed that the US and UK were “thinking the same on Dhi Qar
and
Muthanna”
it would be important to engage the US soon in relation to Maysan
if the UK
considered
that the right approach view was to focus its effort on Basra
alone.
830.
In his 3 March
weekly report, Lt Gen Rollo wrote that he sensed MNF and
Iraqi
eyes were
increasingly turning to the South and Basra.405
It was
important for the UK to
understand
the implications for future UK responsibilities there and to “force
the pace so
that we can
more accurately gauge our own contribution to it”. The size of the
area for
which the
UK would be militarily responsible remained a key
issue.
831.
A second key
issue was “what we do while we are there”. Lt Gen Rollo saw
two
aspects:
the scale of the contribution and the relationship with the UK’s
Iraqi partners.
On the
scale of contribution he wrote:
“From a
Baghdad perspective I have only three points. The first is that the
force
structure
should be able to carry out the tasks agreed between CJO and
General
Petraeus.
The second is that the continued use of force level reductions as
the
principal
metric of success seems increasingly at odds with the reality of
Iraq today.
The third
is that our willingness and ability to deliver genuine non-military
effect will
also be a
factor in US thinking …
“For most
of the last four years, Basra has been, understandably, an economy
of
force
operation. However, with the Iraq Strategy nearing completion, I
hope that it
will look
at our plans for 2008/09 in the context of the wider campaign. I
have no
doubt that
our longer term military focus ought to be on a BMATT [British
Military
Advisory
and Training Team] … but in the short term we need to get Basra
right. If
there is
unfinished business in Basra, and there is, it is clearly Iraqi
business to do
403
Manuscript
comment Ferguson to Browne on Minute White-Spunner to CJO, 29
February 2008,
‘GOC MND(SE)
Weekly Letter – 21 [sic] February 2008’.
404
Minute
White-Spunner to CJO, 29 February 2008, ‘GOC MND(SE) Weekly Letter
–
21 [sic]
February 2008’.
405
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 3 March 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (290) 2 Mar
08’.
335