8 | The
invasion
518.
The
relationship between the size of a military sector and the
wider
contingent
liabilities, including the impact on potential UK civilian
responsibility
for
administration and reconstruction, was not addressed.
519.
On 25 March,
the FCO sent its response to Mr Blair’s request for further
advice
on the
size of a UK sector, the duration of the UK commitment and the exit
strategy.329
520.
The FCO
advice, agreed with the MOD and copied to DFID and the
Treasury,
reflected
much of Mr Dodds’ advice to Mr Brown.
521.
On the size of
the UK sector, the FCO wrote:
“… we need
to determine in the first instance the nature of the military task,
and
make an
assessment of the UK and other Coalition resources likely to be
available.
Only then
can we answer the question about geographical coverage. If the task
is
to promote
a secure environment, the size of the area will depend on the
number of
troops that
are available and the attitude of the Iraqis. The expectation is
that Basra,
and the
area around it, linked to existing administrative boundaries,
should be the
focus.
Plans need to remain flexible until we are able to define the task
and confirm
the
attitude of the population. US thinking appears to have moved away
from too
early
definition of ‘sectors’ for exactly the reasons explained
above.”
522.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Mr Blair wrote:
“We took
the decision to take on responsibility for the South sector,
following
Jack Straw
and Geoff Hoon’s joint note to me of 19 March. This was the
inevitable
outcome of
the decision that our military contribution should be through the
South.
I was also
keen that this be our Area of Operation because it seemed clear
that the
South would
be more manageable. The South – Shia and heavily anti-Saddam
–
was likely
to be relatively supportive. And to begin with, this was indeed the
case.
It was
agreed that we should do it, without demur, as I
recall.”
523.
Lt Gen
Reith warned the Chiefs of Staff on 21 March that there were
already
signs that
pre-conflict assumptions about the nature and duration of the
conflict
had been
wrong, with implications for Phase IV planning.
524.
Lt Gen
Reith advised that the Coalition “must be prepared” for high,
medium
and low
levels of consent.
525.
Lt Gen Reith
produced an update on Phase IV planning for the Chiefs of
Staff
on 21
March.330
He warned
that Phase IV delivery remained subject to “uncertain
US dynamics
at the pol/mil [politico-military] level”. US planning continued,
but was
“primarily
bottom-up”, and CFLCC was still seeking guidance on key issues
including
governance,
payment of salaries and “regeneration” of the
military.
329
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 25 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military Contribution to
Post-Conflict Iraq’.
330
Minute
Reith to COSSEC, 21 March 2003, ‘Phase IV Planning – Taking
Stock’.
93