3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
to resist
the logic that we must take action to deal with an evil regime that
threatened
us with
its WMD programme”.
577.
Mr Blair
considered that the US and UK would “still face the question of
why
they had
decided to act now; what had changed?” In his view one of the
lessons of
11 September
was that: “Failure to take action in good time meant that the risks
would
only grow,
and might force us to take much more costly action
later.”
578.
Sir David
Manning also recorded that, following a further conversation
with
President
Bush, Mr Blair had concluded that President Bush wanted to build a
coalition,
and that
had led him to dismiss pressure from some on the American
right.
579.
The record
contained no reference to any discussion of conditions which would
be
necessary
for military action.
580.
A letter from
Sir Christopher Meyer to Sir David Manning on 15 May indicated
that
Mr Blair
and President Bush had also discussed the first quarter of 2003 as
a timeframe
for action
against Saddam Hussein.222
581.
Mr Powell told
the Inquiry that, at Crawford:
“…
[President] Bush acknowledged the possibility that Saddam would
allow
inspectors
in and let them go about their business. If that happened we would
have
to adjust
our approach accordingly.
“So it was
absolutely clear we were not signing up for a war … we were
signing
up for
going down the UN route and giving Saddam a chance to
comply.”223
582.
Asked if
military options were discussed, Mr Powell replied:
“I don’t
recall them getting into any sort of discussion of military options
…”
583.
Mr Powell
added that he thought Mr Blair’s message to President Bush
was:
“… if you
are going to do this, you have got to do this in the most
intelligent manner
possible,
like after Afghanistan, like after 9/11. You have got to put this
on a political
track …
build support. You have got to go down the UN route. You have got
to
exhaust
that UN route … to give Saddam a chance to comply.”224
584.
Mr Powell
stated that Mr Blair was talking about the things that would
need
to be done
to make action against Iraq successful:
“The first
was to put the Middle East peace process in a different place …
That
strikes me
as a fundamental point that he repeated again and again
subsequent
222
Letter
Meyer to Manning, 15 May 2002, ‘Your Visit to
Washington’.
223
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, page 24.
224
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, pages 24-25.
493