The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the time
they need to “sniff out” the weapons … and all Saddam needs to do
is to
offer
passive co-operation, ie the absence of obstruction. Obviously if
this is right,
they could
be there for months or years.”
“Our view,
which is correct is that time is irrelevant unless he [Saddam]
is
co‑operating
fully and actively. If he isn’t, the time needed is just the time
necessary
to make a
judgement as to his co-operation: is it full or not? And actually,
no one …
is
seriously suggesting Saddam is co-operating fully.”
605.
Mr Blair
wrote that Dr Blix “unfortunately” embodied that confusion.
His report
to the
Security Council on 14 February “never suggested there was full
co-operation;
indeed the
opposite”. But the tone “seemed to imply that because Saddam
was
co‑operating
more on process, that was an improvement despite the fact that
there
was no
co-operation on substance”.
606.
Mr Blair
reported that recent conversations with Dr Blix showed that he
was “aware
of this
problem, and is prepared to countenance a definitive judgement and
was shocked
at how
negatively for the US/UK his report was spun”. Mr Blair added:
“My faith in Blix
is somewhat
shaken. But he remains key.”
“… the
trick we need to take is this: we have to find a way of re-focusing
the issue
on the
absence of full co-operation … and do so in a way that pulls public
opinion
and the
UNSC waverers back to us by showing that we have indeed made
every
effort to
avoid war.”
608.
Mr Blair
proposed that the US and UK should:
•
Put down a
new resolution “soon, probably early next week”. That
resolution
would be
“simple and clear and as easy to vote for as we can make
it”.
•
Put the
resolution “to a vote on 14 March, the date France has
suggested
for a [Security
Council] meeting of Foreign Ministers”. That would then
become
“the
deadline for action”.
•
“At the
same time” the resolution was tabled, there would be a side
statement
defining
the categories of full co-operation: “full disclosure of the 1998
leftovers;
witnesses
interviewed outside Iraq; destruction of the rocket motors etc”.
That
should be
“sufficient if he did it, to amount to a complete and total
capitulation
by Saddam”.
That was “the ultimatum”.
609.
Mr Blair
wrote that he would be speaking to Dr Blix the following day
to try to “tie”
him in “to
accept this is indeed what must happen”.
288