The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
246.
Following
three conversations with Mr Blair, President Lagos
remained
adamant
that more time was needed and that nobody would view a
deadline
of 24 March as
serious.
247.
After his
conversation with President Bush, Mr Blair spoke again to
President
Lagos to
say that one last effort was needed to get Saddam Hussein to
comply:
“Ten days
was adequate for him [Saddam Hussein] to make the right
statements,
get the interviews
going and produce the hidden anthrax.”84
248.
President
Lagos was not convinced; in his view, even 24 March looked too
short
a deadline,
and that nobody would believe it was serious. He wanted to talk to
other
Security
Council members.
249.
After
consultations on 11 March, Sir Jeremy Greenstock reported that
the
draft
resolution tabled by the UK, US and Spain on 7 March had “no chance
of
adoption”
and that avoiding providing the US “with a new basis for the use
of
force” was
“a major criterion for most members of the Council”. The UK
now
faced “a
choice between a number of hard options”.
250.
Dr Blix
had questioned whether it was right to describe failure to
co-operate,
and in
particular to take part in interviews, as “a very serious
crime”.
251.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock was given authority to circulate the UK’s “language”
to
Security
Council colleagues.85
A decision
on whether to speak to the French would be
subject to
consultation with Sir Jeremy and a conversation should take place
“only at
the end
of the New York day”.
252.
Reporting
discussions in New York on 11 March on the draft resolution and
details
of a
possible “side statement”, Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised that he
had discussed the
proposed
tests with Dr Blix and Dr Dimitri Perricos, the UNMOVIC
Director of Planning
253.
They had
raised a number of questions about the tests, the timelines for
assessing
Iraqi
actions and who would judge compliance. Dr Blix
was:
•
“concerned”
about the statement that Iraq should yield proscribed
items
“immediately”
for destruction, “without delay” would be “more
realistic”.
In addition
“he wondered whether it was right to refer to a failure to
co-operate
with
UNMOVIC/IAEA, and in particular to take part in interviews, as a
‘very
serious’
crime”; and
84
Letter
Cannon to McDonald, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversations with Bush and Lagos,
11
March’.
85
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 11 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Gameplan for 11
March’.
86
Telegram
417 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 12 March 2003, ‘Personal Iraq:
Side Statement and
End Game
Options’.
442