The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
84.
The Butler
Report stated:
“In the
late 1970s, Iraq obtained large quantities of uranium ore from
Niger, Portugal
and Brazil.
By the mid-1980s, however, Iraq had become self-sufficient in
uranium
ore, which
was a by-product of indigenous phosphate mines … which extracted
and
purified
the uranium ore for subsequent use in nuclear enrichment
processes.”23
85.
After the
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Joint Intelligence
Committee (JIC)
issued a
number of Assessments about Iraq’s possession of weapons of
mass
destruction
and its intentions.
86.
The role and
responsibilities of the JIC for providing Ministers and senior
officials
with
regular intelligence Assessments on a range of issues of immediate
and long-term
importance
to national interests, primarily in the fields of security, defence
and foreign
affairs are
set out in Section 2.
87.
The JIC
assessed Iraq’s nuclear capabilities in September 1990 and judged
that,
without
“significant external assistance”, it would take Iraq:
•
“at least
three years to establish a production facility for fissile
material;
•
one more
year before sufficient weapons-grade material would be available
for
the
production of one nuclear device; and
•
a further
year or more (ie 1995 at the earliest) before there would be
enough
material
for a small stockpile of 3-4 weapons.”24
88.
The JIC’s
Assessment was based on an assumption that Iraq was “using only
a
centrifuge
route” for enriching fissile material which was “later shown to be
incorrect”.
89.
The JIC also
examined, “on the basis of intelligence”, the possibility that Iraq
might
have
authorised a “crash programme” to produce an untested nuclear
device.
90.
That would
have required Iraq to divert nuclear material stored at civil sites
in breach
of IAEA
safeguards, to have recovered unburnt uranium from reactor fuel and
to have
advanced
work on firing systems and high explosive parts to the stage where
they could
be
incorporated into a nuclear device.
•
“If and
only if all of these conditions were met … it is conceivable that
Iraq could
have the
capability to make an untested nuclear weapon … with a yield
of
approximately
20 kilotonnes by the end of this year.”
23
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
pages
121-122.
24
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
pages
42-43.
40