3.7 | Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March 2003

901. A typed version of Mr Blair’s note, with Mr Rycroft’s comments, is published with

this report.280

902. A separate minute from Mr Rycroft, stating “You asked for a plan we could

work up with the Mexicans and Chileans, as a way of bringing them to vote for the

second resolution”, elaborated on the suggestion of identifying benchmarks to define

“full co‑operation”, making clear that judgements were for the Security Council;

and that Dr Blix’s reports “would form an important basis for the facts underpinning

the judgements”.281

903. Mr Rycroft added that that differed from previous work on benchmarks because

it was “us” not Dr Blix “putting forward the benchmarks and answering the questions

on Iraqi compliance”.

904. The minute set out the key demands in resolution 1441 and a note listing

benchmarks on biological weapons, chemical weapons, missiles, documentation

and personnel. On tactics and timing, Mr Rycroft advised Mr Blair:

• “we face an uphill struggle securing US agreement to any further time”.

• The judgements on Iraqi performance “must not” be tied to Dr Blix’s report

to the Security Council on 7 March, and the UK should not “seek or encourage

a further Blix report after 7 March”.

• The UK “must avoid at all costs a further Council decision after our

second resolution”.

• The UK “could be vague publicly about when we would judge Iraqi behaviour”.

• The UK “would have to make clear privately to the US that we were talking about

making those judgements at some point next week or at the latest early in the

week of 17 March”.

905. Mr Rycroft also wrote:

• Sir David Manning had not seen the proposals.

• Mr Straw wanted to talk to Mr Blair “as soon as possible”.

• The FCO opposed benchmarks on the grounds that Saddam Hussein would fulfil

a few of them.

• The UK needed to make clear that “full, positive answers to all of the questions”

would be needed to demonstrate full co-operation – “destruction of a handful

of Al Samouds is a small part of the picture”.

• Sir Jeremy Greenstock should advise on the tactics: “His advice so far is that

we should not respond to the Chilean concerns until after 7 March, because

it may be unnecessary if by then the Chileans intend to vote for our resolution

and because it would cause a split with the US …”

280 Note, [undated], ‘Iraq: PM’s note of 3 March, with MR comments in italics’.

281 Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 3 March 2003, ‘Iraq, Blix, Benchmarks and More Time?’

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