The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
176.
With its
advice to No.10 on “possible UNSCRs and a game plan for
securing
them” of 4
September, which is addressed in Section 3.4, Mr Straw’s
Private Office
also provided:
•
a “script
on why the problem of Iraqi WMD was being treated differently
from
other WMD
programmes”; and
•
a “note
setting out the broader problem of WMD proliferation and the
action
we are
taking to tackle it”.84
177.
The script on
Iraq’s WMD stated that there were:
“…
particular concerns about Iraq’s WMD programmes. Since Iraq’s
persistent
obstruction
forced the UN Inspectors to leave in 1998, Iraq has maintained
its
chemical
and biological weapons programmes, and is developing ballistic
missiles
capable of
delivering them to targets beyond the 150km limit imposed by the
UN
for defensive
systems.”
178.
The “key
differences between Iraq and other countries such as Iran
and
North Korea”
were that:
•
Saddam
Hussein had used WMD.
•
UNSCOM had
uncovered the scale of his programmes.
•
Iraq had
“been shown to have broken every commitment it has ever
made
under the
NPT [Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons] and
BTWC
[Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention] (it is not a member of the
CWC
[Chemical
Weapons Convention])”.
•
Iraq was
“in flagrant violation” of 14 UN Security Council resolutions
relating to
its WMD and
missile programmes, and was in violation of nine of the
remaining
13
obligations on other issues.
179.
The script
added that the UK approaches “to Iraq and to other governments
with
WMD
programmes of concern” were “fundamentally identical”: political
and diplomatic
engagement.
But:
“… in the
case of Iraq, the diplomatic route has been constantly obstructed
by
Saddam’s
intransigence and duplicity, and has been blocked altogether
since
Inspectors
left in 1998 – leaving us no alternative but to consider other
options.”
180.
The note,
‘Proliferation of WMD: The Wider Context’, described the “wider
problem
of the
proliferation of WMD and long-range missiles” and “An additional
increased
concern
since 11 September 2001” that international terrorists would obtain
WMD.
Iraq, Iran,
North Korea, Libya and Syria were identified as “priorities for
counter-action
… (as
the most likely to pose a threat to the UK, our allies, or deployed
UK forces)”.
84
Letter
Sedwill to Manning, 4 September 2002, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper ‘Iraq:
UNSC Action’ and Note,
‘Proliferation
of WMD: The Wider Context’.
146