The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Mr McKane
also wrote that nothing had happened to change the Ministerial
conclusion
earlier in
the year that, if patrolling of the southern Zone ceased, “an
unacceptably high
risk” of
“extreme humanitarian distress” would remain.
Mr McKane
informed Sir David Manning that the MOD had been asked what
would
have to be
done to ensure that Kuwait could be defended effectively if
patrolling over the
southern
NFZ stopped. He suggested that “once the immediate crisis is over”
the issue
should be
considered again; stopping patrolling in the Zones could “remove a
major
source of
discomfort from our relations with the Arab world”.85
At the
Cabinet Office meeting on 30 October, the MOD reported that the US
had “returned
to normal
operations over Iraq” but there were “fewer coalition patrols over
a more
restricted
area (largely south and west of the Euphrates)”.86
Contingency
plans in the
event that
a coalition aircraft was shot down were being discussed with the
US.
In January
2002, Mr McKane reported that there had been no Iraqi violation of
the
southern
No-Fly Zone since 11 September 2001, and that the last Allied
bombing of
an Iraq air
defence target had taken place on 27 November 2001.87
The MOD
was
“concerned
about the risks to RAF aircrew” and considering whether “It might
be
necessary
to attack air defence targets north of the 33rd parallel … in order
to make it
safe for
such patrols to be resumed.”
153.
In late
October, Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised that a damaging
“vacuum”
in
collective policy towards Iraq was looming; a “clear long-term
strategy” agreed
with the US
would be needed. The key elements included determining
whether
UNMOVIC had
any genuine value and convincing the US that the UK would
not
support
heavy military action against Iraq. The UK could not do nothing and
allow
“war
against Iraq to become the only option by default”.
154.
Officials
concluded that a revised draft resolution was the
preferred
option but,
if that was not achievable, a rollover resolution would just
sustain
containment.
155.
A paper
written within the FCO on 24 October stated that the US was
deliberately
keeping
open the option of coercive military action and US military
Commanders in Chief
had been
“instructed … to work up contingency plans for dealing with
terrorist targets
within
their area of responsibility”.88
The MOD was
“trying to discover some of the detail”.
156.
In relation to
Iraq, the FCO paper stated that it was:
“The prime
candidate for military action among US hawks and the only
realistic
target for
coercive/punitive/regime-change military action (as opposed to
targeted
85
Minute
McKane to Manning, 17 October 2001, ‘Iraq: No Fly
Zones’.
86
Minute
McKane to Manning, 31 October 2001, ‘Iraq’.
87
Minute
McKane to Manning, 15 January 2002, ‘Iraq’.
88
Minute
Bloomfield to Wright, 24 October 2001, ‘Terrorist and State
Sponsors: Possible US Strategies’
attaching
Paper, ‘Terrorist and State Sponsors: Possible US
Strategies’.
340