The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
696.
The thinking
behind the vision was expressed most clearly in the draft letter
from
Sir David
Manning to Dr Rice, which stated that it would be helpful to be
able to say
soon how
the US and UK saw the government of Iraq after Saddam
Hussein:
“Our
starting point is that the humanitarian, reconstruction and civil
administration
tasks are
too complex and too resource intensive for the US and UK to
undertake
alone …
Most potential contributors … will only feel comfortable
participating … if
there is a
UN authorising mandate. They will not arrogate to themselves the
right to
redesign
Iraq, however desirable the end state. And nor would we. We shall
need
Security
Council authorisation for legal reasons too.”306
697.
The draft
letter concluded:
“Handing
Iraq’s reconstruction over to a UN-authorised CTA will allow us to
reduce
our
presence in Iraq and leave the country with honour. Indeed, unless
we do so,
I am
far from convinced that we can succeed in Phase IV.”
698.
The FCO
explained that the draft letter did not refer to the outline for
Phase IVb
that had
been shared with Lt Gen Garner, “in case David Manning thought it
was a
bridge too
far, at this stage, to put to Condi Rice”.307
699.
The letter
appears never to have been sent. When Sir David next wrote to Dr
Rice,
on 10
March, it was in the context of work on a draft Security Council
resolution.
700.
The FCO sent a
separate draft ‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’ to No.10
on
28 February.
701.
President
Bush described the US post-conflict commitment to Iraq in
a
speech on
26 February. He stated that rebuilding Iraq would take “a
sustained
commitment
from many nations, including our own: we will remain in Iraq as
long
as
necessary, and not a day more”.
702.
In a speech at
the American Enterprise Institute on 26 February, described in
more
detail in
Section 3.7, President Bush stated:
“If we must
use force, the United States and our Coalition stand ready to help
the
citizens of
a liberated Iraq …
“We will
provide security against those who try to spread chaos … We will
seek to
protect
Iraq’s natural resources from sabotage by a dying regime, and
ensure those
resources
are used for the benefit of the owners – the Iraqi
people.
“The United
States has no intention of determining the precise form of Iraq’s
new
government
… All Iraqis must have a voice in the new government, and all
citizens
must have
their rights protected.
306
Letter
[draft] Manning to Rice, 24 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Phase
IV’.
307
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 26 February 2002, ‘Iraq: Phase IV’.
438