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14.1  |  Military equipment (post-conflict)
the area of capability integration; this being the responsibility of the Chief of Joint
Operations (CJO)”.
82.  The study was endorsed in December and lead elements of the EC Branch
deployed to Iraq in January 2005.36 The MND(SE) EC Branch was formally established
in theatre on 24 February 2005, and was staffed by three staff officers.
83.  The EC Branch produced an ‘Initial Deployment Report’ on 10 June 2005,
considering its performance so far and making recommendations for its longer‑term
role.37
84.  The report stated that the EC Branch initially performed “two discrete roles”. The first
was the provision of support to the UOR process, on behalf of MND(SE), by providing a
central focus for UOR activity and taking the lead in the co‑ordination of requirements,
capturing activity and SOR staffing. The EC cell’s mandate did not explicitly state that
EC Branch could “engage authoritatively in UOR integration matters”. That had been
“identified as a key MND(SE) shortfall” in the report.
85.  Although having no formal mandate to do so, the EC cell did engage in UOR
integration activity, which had meant creating appropriate structures and procedures to
support the effective integration of UOR capabilities. The cell established a “Capability
Integration Working Group (CIWG) framework, formalised Capability Integration Plans
(CIP), and ensuring that theatre capability issues were addressed across the Defence
Lines of Development (DLOD)”.38 That work had “already proven instrumental in
identifying a number of capability issues likely to have an adverse effect on theatre
operations” and in identifying action to mitigate those issues. The report stated that
the work would enable the EC cell to “deliver greater benefit than its current MND(SE)
focused role would normally permit”.
86.  In the report, the cell recommended that “a broader remit, acting on behalf of CJO”
would also enable the EC Branch to deliver greater benefit. The cell did not recommend
any changes to EC Branch staffing levels, “due to the continued evolution of the Branch
… and the awaited outcome of this report”.
87.  The report contained a number of lessons:
The formation and deployment of the EC Branch was “too late to deliver
maximum benefit to the operation”. Maximum benefit of an EC Branch capability
would be realised “if it is embedded within the force prior to or immediately
36  Minute, 10 June 2005, ‘Multi National Division (South East) Equipment Capability – Initial Deployment
Report’.
37  Minute, 10 June 2005, ‘Multi National Division (South East) Equipment Capability – Initial Deployment
Report’.
38  The MOD framework for capability assessment recommends breaking down capabilities into eight
constituent elements, or “Defence Lines of Development”: Training, Equipment, Personnel, Information,
Concepts and Doctrine, Organisation, Infrastructure and Logistics.
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