3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
route we
should not rule out the possibility of military action without a
second
resolution.
Voting decisions in the Security Council could be driven by
domestic
politics,
not the demands of the international situation.”
557.
Mr Straw
added that:
“In his
recent contacts with the Muslim and Arab world, all could see the
benefit of
Saddam
Hussein’s demise. He had utterly rejected the notion that we were
hostile
to Islam
… Saddam Hussein had attacked his own people and his neighbours –
all
of whom
were Muslims.”
558.
Ms Short
told the Cabinet that “keeping to the United Nations route would
hold the
Government’s
support together. She had been reviewing humanitarian scenarios for
Iraq
and
concluded that extra resources would be required, given the other
humanitarian
priority of
Southern Africa.”
559.
Ms Short
added that the possibility “of chemical and biological weapons
being used
inside
Iraq, and their effect on local civilians”, was a “particularly
worrying scenario”.
The
involvement of the United Nations would be “essential” for the
management of the
aftermath
of military action: it would “provide legitimacy for the political
and economic
reconstruction
of Iraq, including the use of oil revenues. Work on the aftermath
should
be taken
forward urgently.”
560.
Points made
during the discussion were:
•
Communication
“needed to be improved, on the basis of a core
script”.
The message
was “complex but should start from first principles; part of
the
message was
that the policy flowed from our own national interest and
respect
for
international law”. A “small proportion of the population would
always be
opposed to
military action, the political battle was for the centre ground
which
could be
won by argument”.
•
Although
Mr Blair, Mr Straw and Mr Hoon were “best able to
speak from an
informed
position, since they had access to the intelligence, Cabinet
members
more
generally needed to speak up for the Government’s policy on
Iraq”.
•
The
“leadership of the United States was not widely trusted” in the UK
“but
President
Bush’s resolve was weakening the Iraqi regime”.
•
“[T]he
inspectors had only recently started their work and it was
unreasonable
for
opponents to assert that the absence of evidence so far meant that
military
action was
unjustified; once evidence of weapons of mass destruction
was
produced,
the public mood would change dramatically”.
•
Maintaining
internal cohesion within the UK “was important, not least in
respect
of the
Islamic community”.
•
“[P]ushing
the Middle East Peace Process forward remained an important
part
of our
policy, as was stability in the region”.
99