12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
548.
On 30 April,
the Cabinet Office assessed that in MND(SE) most ICDC
battalions
and the
police should be able to operate without a full‑time MNF presence
by 30 June,
although it
conceded that the ISF in MND(SE) had not faced the level of
challenge that
many others
faced in the April violence.495
549.
Similarly, the
MOD assessed that following the transfer, “by 1 July, the ISF
will
have the
lead for security and the MNF will be operating in support of
them”.496
The
MOD
assessed the position in Muthanna, Dhi Qar and Basra provinces
positively: in
some areas
the ISF would “operate without any assistance at all except a
standby Quick
Reaction
Force”. The MOD plan was to minimise its “overt presence” by, for
example,
relocating
from Basra Palace (inside the city) to Basra Airport (outside the
city).
In Maysan province,
the security situation was considered to be more
challenging
(as described
later in this Section).
550.
On 28 June
2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) formally handed
over to
a sovereign
Iraqi Government, the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG), and
Dr Allawi became
the Iraqi
Prime Minister. The process of establishing the IIG is described in
Section 9.2.
551.
On 20 June,
Prime Minister Designate Allawi set out his military
capacity‑building
strategy in
a televised press statement.497
552.
Dr Allawi’s
strategy included a 6,000‑strong intervention force with both
police and
army
components, the creation of a Special Forces Organisation and
continued ING and
553.
Mr Falah
Haasan al‑Naqib was appointed as the Minister of Interior
and
Mr Hazem Shalan
al‑Khuzaei was appointed as the Minister for
Defence.499
Dr Rubaie
continued
to serve as the National Security Adviser. Mr Barham Saleh
became Deputy
Prime
Minister for National Security.
554.
During the CPA
era, the metric used to measure progress with the ISF was
the
number of
personnel on duty.500
Immediately
after the transition, that metric was replaced
by “trained
and equipped” personnel. The net result was a 75 percent drop in
recorded
MOI force
totals, from 181,297 “on duty” personnel on 15 June 2004, to 47,255
“trained
and
equipped” personnel on 25 August 2004.
495
Minute Dodd
to Quarrey, 30 April 2004, ‘Iraqi Security Force
Capabilities’.
496
Letter
Naworynsky to Rycroft, 10 June 2004, ‘MND(SE): Handing over
Responsibility for Security
to the Iraqis’.
497
Telegram
337 Iraqrep to FCO London, 20 June 2004, ‘Iraq: Statement of Prime
Minister Allawi on
Iraqi Security’.
498
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 29 June 2004, ‘Iraq:
Strategy Group’.
499
BBC
News, 1 June
2004, Interim
Iraqi Government.
500
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
175