3.3 |
Development of UK strategy and options,
April to July 2002
•
what sort
of battlefield environment was anticipated, and the response to
any
use of
biological or chemical weapons;
•
how much
progress would be needed on Arab/Israel before the US
launched
an attack;
•
the impact
of military action on the oil price; and
•
the mood in
Parliament, the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) and the
country
and when we
should time a public information campaign.
336.
Sir David
Manning concluded:
“In the
light of this discussion, you might call Bush and prepare a note
for him before
the summer
break – along the lines proposed in Jonathan’s minute … Timing is
for
discussion.
It might be best to wait until the middle of next week, after I
have been
to Washington
for further talks with Condi and Tenet.”
337.
Mr Blair’s
meeting on 23 July did not take firm decisions.
338.
The record
of the meeting stated that the UK should work on the
assumption
that it
would take part in any military action and Admiral Boyce could tell
the US
that the UK
was considering a range of options.
339.
Mr Blair
commissioned further advice and background material on all
the
issues,
including a possible ultimatum to Iraq and the legal basis for
action.
340.
No
conclusion is recorded on who would approach the US
Administration,
when, or
what the objectives and tactics of that approach would
be.
341.
Mr Blair
discussed Iraq with Mr Straw and Mr Hoon, Lord
Goldsmith,
Sir Richard Wilson,
Adm Boyce, Sir Richard Dearlove, Sir Francis
Richards
(Director of the
Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ)), Mr
Scarlett,
Mr Jonathan
Powell, Baroness Morgan (Director of Political and
Government
Communications),
Mr Campbell and Sir David Manning, on 23 July.134
342.
Mr Rycroft’s
record of the meeting noted that:
•
Mr Scarlett
summarised the intelligence and latest (4 July) JIC
Assessment:
“Saddam’s
regime was tough and based on extreme fear. The only way
to
overthrow
it was likely to be by massive military action.” Saddam Hussein
was
“worried
and expected an attack”, but he was “not convinced” that an
attack
would be
“immediate or overwhelming”. Real support for Saddam
Hussein
was “probably
narrowly based”.
•
Sir Richard
Dearlove reported that there was “a perceptible shift in
attitude”
in
Washington: “Military action was now seen as inevitable.” President
Bush
“wanted to
remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the
conjunction
134
Minute
Rycroft to Manning, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Meeting,
23 July’.
59