4.4 | The
search for WMD
•
Other
judgements had been “borne out, including by UNMOVIC”, for
instance:
{{the
“illegal programme[s]” to “extend the range of the Al Samoud
missile”
and
“produce even longer range missiles”;
{{concealment of
documents at homes of personnel associated with WMD
programmes”;
and
{{“suspicious
programmes to manufacture long range UAVs [unmanned
aerial
vehicles]”.
•
The
“testimony of scientists and documentation about WMD
development
and
production programmes” would be “the key”. But witnesses could not
be
expected to
come forward until they were confident they could speak
safely.
153.
On the issue
of a role for UN inspectors, Mr Miller wrote:
“We
appreciate the need for credible, independent validation of any
discoveries …
UNMOVIC and
the IAEA would be an option …
“As Dr Blix
himself has said, the circumstances are not right for the
inspectors to
return to
Iraq at present. If and when they do, their tasks would have
changed: the
focus would
be on monitoring and verification rather than detection. That would
call
for
different skills – some restructuring of the operation would be
needed …”
154.
In his monthly
press conference on 28 April, Mr Blair stated that “the
first priority
has got to
be to stabilise” Iraq, the second was the humanitarian situation,
and:
“… the
third – and we can take our time about this and so we should – is
to make
sure that
we investigate the weapons of mass destruction, and we will do
that.
And as
I say every time I am asked, I remain confident that they will be
found.”78
155.
Asked about
why Saddam Hussein had not used weapons of mass destruction
and
whether the
UN needed to be involved to verify any finds, Mr Blair made a
number of
points,
including:
•
Independent
verification needed to be discussed “with the UN and
amongst
allies”,
but he had “no doubt at all that … some process of
independent
verification”
was needed.
•
There
wasn’t “any doubt that Iraq has had” WMD.
•
Before the
return of the inspectors, “there was a six-month campaign
of
concealment”.
That was “borne out by sufficient intelligence” that there
was
“no doubt”
in his mind that was what happened.
•
That meant
it was “going to be far more difficult for them to reconstitute
that
material to
use”, and “we were giving very strong warnings to commanders
in
the fields
as to what would happen if they did”.
78
10 Downing
Street, 28 April 2003, PM focuses
on Iraq and domestic agenda.
455