The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
15.
The plan would
require the UK to:
“… weave
together three disparate levels of formation (1 MEF, 1(UK) Armd
Div
[1st (UK)
Armoured Division], a Cdo Bde [Commando Brigade], an AA [Air
Assault]
Bde and an
armd bde [armoured brigade]) neither of which … have trained
nor
operated
together in recent history. Their mission rehearsal starts 8
Feb[ruary] 03 …
under the
full gaze of the rest of the Coalition, and they had better be
ready for it.”
16.
Brigadier
Whitley observed that time was “running out”. The US was “desperate
to
see a UK
inflow and logistics plan” and there was:
“… no time
left to probe UK/US capabilities in the formal and, perhaps
methodical
manner that
has been done to date. Now is the time for ruthless,
hard-hitting
planning …
The UK is an issue they [the US] are eager to address – as each
day
passes now
this issue is snowballing and soon (probably by 12 Jan 03) it will
be
difficult
to control inside the planning timelines.”
17.
Brigadier
Whitley recommended “most strongly”:
•
“that any
opportunity for worthwhile UK involvement of land forces in the
North
has come
and gone”;
•
that “UK
tailored forces of a divisional headquarters, 3 Cdo Bde RM
[3
Commando
Brigade Royal Marines], 16 AA Bde [16 Air Assault Brigade]
and
the
necessary logistic C2 [Command and Control] and CSS [Combat
Service
Support] is
committed to the South”; and
•
“Acceptance,
in principle, of a UK Area of Operations and mission in an
area
of southern
Iraq bounded in the north by the Euphrates.”
18.
Brigadier
Whitley concluded:
“The effect
of timely decisions on the above on our own ability to
successfully
conduct
operations and on our US allies cannot be
underestimated.”
19.
The MOD has
been unable to locate any later version of Brigadier Whitley’s
advice.5
20.
The US
request was based on a number of key assumptions, including
that
the UK
wanted a significant role in combat operations and that it wanted
to
operate at
divisional level with a divisional Area of Responsibility
(AOR).
21.
The
military response was immediate and positive and led to
a
recommendation
to deploy large scale ground forces to the South.
22.
Deploying
UK ground forces to southern Iraq constituted a step
change
for the UK,
providing it with a far more prominent role in the operational
plan.
5
Letter MOD
to Iraq Inquiry, 1 November 2012, [untitled].
390