6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
regarded as
absolutely essential. There was a risk that Saddam wasn’t going
to
disarm.
There was a risk that we were not going to get the broad Coalition
that we
wanted, and
I … felt at that stage it was quite important to consider all the
issues,
including
the cost of not proceeding with the Americans.”89
260.
Sir Kevin
stated that he was “reconstructing events on the basis of
personal
“… recorded
my concerns and the message was very clear: we need to
work
harder at
making sure our conditions are fully understood and taken up by
the
US Administration.”
261.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry in February 2010 that he thought Ministers
had
had a
discussion about the issues, but he was “not sure about the
detail”.91
262.
Asked whether
he had seen a point at which the Government at the most
senior
decision-making
levels had fully reviewed and thrashed out the whole range of
its
options,
Sir Kevin Tebbit replied that he “never saw that process taking
place” and that
he was not
“party to those discussions in No.10”.92
263.
Sir Kevin
added that, in the second half of January, he had sensed “that
was
the point
when Ministers were coming to major decision point”, and “it was
also the
point where
Hoon was recommending the southern option to Government”.
His
“understanding
was that there was a pretty full discussion”.93
264.
In May 2010,
Sir Kevin Tebbit told the Inquiry:
“Over
Christmas I recall being concerned that … suddenly we were looking
at
a different
option, the South, which we hadn’t been planning for.
“… I was
very concerned before things went further it would be very good
for
Ministers
to sit down and really discuss this fully … I wrote my concerns
to
Geoff Hoon
in a private note, manuscript … advising him that I really thought
he
ought to
talk to his colleagues … and look at it in the round again and
pause. I
was very
concerned that the machine seemed to be moving, and I don’t just
mean
the
military machine. I just mean the process seemed to be going on
without a full
Ministerial
discussion.
“Geoff Hoon
said to me … I understand, I think that’s very important. He said,
I just
want a note
from you on one aspect, and that is the US/UK relationship and
the
implications
of not proceeding, how important is this to us in bilateral terms.
So
I wrote him
a note purely on that issue, as a sort of aide memoire, for one
part
89
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, pages 11-12.
90
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, page 12.
91
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, page 25.
92
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, page 37.
93
Public
hearing, 3 February 2010, pages 38-39.
423