The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1411.
Asked if he
had offered any advice to the military, Sir Richard
replied:
“… I would
have reported that instantly … I was in touch frequently. Mike
Boyce
and
I were regularly talking to each other. But … it was evident.
It would have been
evident on
the attaché military channels at about the same time.”
1412.
Asked why,
when he had taken the view in October 2002 that Turkey
was
not likely to agree to the deployment of UK forces, the MOD
had persisted,
Sir David Manning
replied:
“Yes, but …
I was wrong about a lot of military things. So there’s no reason
why
I should
have been right about this one. I think probably … because the
Americans
were
telling our military, don’t worry, we will fix it, and … certainly
the Americans
themselves
were surprised at how difficult the Turks proved to be
…”559
1413.
Lord Boyce
told the Inquiry that the decision on 8 January 2003, to switch
to
the South:
“…wasn’t a
sort of cold shock for everybody … The Prime Minister, the
Cabinet
and clearly
the Secretary of State for Defence had … been exposed to the
…
contingency
planning we were doing, should we have to go
South.”560
1414.
Subsequently
Lord Boyce told the Inquiry:
“We
imagined in the very early stages that because there was a NATO
plan giving
access to
come through Turkey to go towards Iraq, but that was something
which
should not
present a great difficulty. Certainly when I spoke to the Chief of
the
Turkish
General Staff, General Özkök, in the very early days,
September/October
or so,
there didn’t appear – well, he didn’t seem to think it would be a
particular
1415.
Lord Boyce
added that “we rather thought” Gen Özkök “had more power
than
he probably
did”, or was prepared to exercise after the Turkish election of a
new
Government.
The MOD “persevered for probably longer than we should have
done
in trying
to get a route through Turkey”.562
1416.
Asked whether
there had been cautionary advice from the FCO about
Turkey’s
position,
Lord Boyce told the Inquiry:
“I can’t
recall at any time being told to back off. As you said, we pressed
on and we
pressed on
until the bitter end when we had to make a final
decision.”563
559
Private
hearing, 24 June 2010, page 103.
560
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 92.
561
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 13.
562
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, pages 14‑15.
563
Public
hearing, 27 January 2011, page 15.
382