9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
within the
week.16
The UNOCS
was pressing ahead with its programme of assistance
and:
“We have
agreed to identify Civil Service experts who might contribute to
UN
seminars.
The UNOCS have asked if we can suggest an authority on
military-civilian
relations,
and have intimated that further support from us in facilitating the
access of
experts
would be most welcome.”
44.
Air Chief
Marshal Glenn Torpy, Chief of Joint Operations, submitted a paper
entitled
‘Operational
Transition in Iraq’ to the Chiefs of Staff on 22 June setting out a
possible
timeline
for withdrawal of UK forces.17
In the
paper he proposed a four-phase transition:
•
“Security
Assistance”, meaning active involvement in SSR;
•
“Transfer
to Provincial Iraqi Control with Tactical Overwatch”, meaning the
Iraqi
Security
Forces (ISF) would take the lead on security with the UK in
support;
•
“Operational
Overwatch” meaning operating from a reduced number of
MNF
bases in
order to reduce profile, while providing reinforcement to Iraqi
forces;
and
•
“Strategic
Overwatch”, described as “The Coalition posture that will
underwrite
Iraqi
self-reliance and the normalisation of bilateral
relationships.”
45.
The second
phase would be reached in Muthanna and Maysan in autumn 2005,
and
in Dhi Qar
and Basra the following spring.
46.
ACM Torpy
stated: “The key condition that guides this time-based approach is
the
relative
capacity of Iraqi provinces to assume full responsibility for their
security.” He
went on to
explain that:
“Operational
Transition depends on growing Iraqi capacity, which
must remain
the
dynamic,
coherent and properly-funded Main Effort.”
47.
On 22 June,
the British Embassy Baghdad reported that General George
Casey,
Commander
of the MNF-I, had returned to the US in order to present his MNF-I
Force
Structure
Review.18
That review
did not envisage any fundamental changes in the
Campaign
Plan, and:
“The US, at
the local military level, accept and understand UK plans in
relation to
MND(SE)
including the point that any future changes in the level of UK
forces in the
south east
would not (not) release troops for redeployment to other areas of
Iraq.”
16
eGram
7276/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 22 June 2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution:
Two Months and Counting’.
17
Minute CJO
to COSSEC, 22 June 2005, ‘Op Telic: Operational Transition in
Iraq’.
18
eGram
7335/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 22 June 2005, ‘Iraq: MNF-I Campaign
Assessment: Emerging
[illegible]’.
495