The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
understand
what their objectives are, to reach a way of achieving those which
is
138.
Asked about
whether the legal issues were folded into the developing
policy
questions,
Lord Goldsmith replied:
“I think in
the event that did happen. As you have heard, on two occasions I
insisted
on offering
a view, even though it wasn’t being asked for, to make sure the
policy, as
it were,
took account of that.”49
139.
Ms Elizabeth
Wilmshurst, a Deputy FCO Legal Adviser, identified a particular
risk
that arose
from the lateness of the definitive advice:
“… on the
process of obtaining the Law Officers’ advice, it was clearly far
from
satisfactory,
and it seemed to have been left right until the end, the request to
him
for his
formal opinion, as if it was simply an impediment that had to be
got over
before the
policy could be implemented, and perhaps a lesson to be learned is
that,
if the Law
Officers’ advice needs to be obtained, as it always does for the
use of
force
issues, then it should be obtained before the deployment of
substantial forces.
For the
Attorney to have advised that the conflict would have been unlawful
without
a second
resolution would have been very difficult at that stage without
handing
Saddam
Hussein a massive public relations advantage. It was extraordinary,
frankly,
to leave
the request to him so late in the day.”50
140.
Asked if it
would have been useful to have had the formal advice of the
Attorney
General
during the period after resolution 1441 when the Armed Forces were
preparing
for
military action, Mr Blair replied:
“No. I
think what was important for him to do was to explain to us what
his concerns
were …
Peter was quite rightly saying to us, ‘These are my concerns. This
is why
I don’t
think 1441 in itself is enough’.
“… [W]e had
begun military preparations even before we got the … 1441
resolution.
We had to
do that otherwise we would never have been in a position to take
military
action. But
let me make it absolutely clear, if Peter in the end had said,
‘This cannot
be
justified lawfully’, we would have been unable to take
action.”51
141.
Asked if he
had any observations on the process by which Lord Goldsmith’s
advice
had been
obtained, Lord Turnbull, Cabinet Secretary between September 2002
and
September
2005, said: “I can see that it would have been better if this had
been done
earlier,
but the list of things for which that is true runs to many
pages.”52
48
Public
hearing, 27 January 2010, page 102.
49
Public
hearing, 27 January 2010, page 232.
50
Public
hearing, 26 January 2010, pages 24-25.
51
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 150.
52
Public
hearing, 25 January 2011, page 25.
32