6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
1104.
Advice to
Mr Hoon on a draft response noted that it:
“…
deliberately does not answer directly the question, (which looks
like a hospital
pass),
whether the COS [Chiefs of Staff] are content with the US plans and
ready to
support
them … CENTCOM … is keeping options open. It is probably misleading
to
think of
the US as having firm plans … We also need to beware of allowing
the tail
to wag the
dog. What we need to know first is whether the US government has
a
political
plan and strategy with which HMG is content.”434
1105.
The MOD
advised Sir David Manning on 29 November that it was
“misleading
to talk of
firm ‘plans’”, not just because of unresolved practical issues such
as Turkish
co‑operation,
but also because the US political strategy remained
“unclear”.435
1106.
There had been
“a significant shift in US military planning” as CENTCOM
sought
to “reduce
the lead times between a political decision and military action”.
Secretary
Rumsfeld
had signed a number of deployment orders to take effect in early
January,
and the US
was “increasingly moving beyond pure planning into at least some
actual
forward
deployments”. That would have the advantages of improving the
prospects of
any
“running start” operation, and provide better options for a rapid
stabilisation mission
in the
event that the Iraqi regime suddenly collapsed, while keeping open
the possibility
of more
deliberate build‑up before the summer of 2003.
1107.
A “gap”
between the UK’s readiness and that of the US was:
“… now
beginning to develop …
“… the
employment of the amphibious element (yet to be endorsed by the
Chiefs
of Staff)
of Package 2 and the additional land contribution in Package 3 are
falling
increasingly
behind their US counterparts in terms of readiness.”
1108.
As any steps
to close that gap would require “further visible activity”,
Ministers
would “need
to consider how far they are prepared to go and how they would
present
such steps
publicly, against a background of continuing uncertainty, including
on
Turkey”.
1109.
The MOD stated
that US planning on the North remained “very much work
in
progress”,
but it was “clear that a UK‑led division could play a significant
role, both
during and
immediately after conflict”: “But the foundation for this – Turkish
acceptance
of a UK
force – is not in place.”
1110.
If Turkey was
ruled out:
“… we would
need to discuss here and with the US what other role we could play;
in
particular,
whether … they would be prepared to adjust their timings and
sequencing
434
Minute
Johnson to PS/Secretary of State, 29 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning – Interim
Response to
Sir David Manning’.
435
Letter
Watkins to Manning, 29 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
341