1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
suffering
in Iraq as a result. Saddam was cheating and getting what he needed
out
of it [the
sanctions regime]. Support for sanctions was disappearing. There
was no
way we
could continue containment on the same basis as we had
before.”25
24.
On 29
September, Mr McKane commissioned the FCO to produce a paper
which
would:
•
review
progress in implementing the strategy on Iraq agreed by the Defence
and
Overseas
Policy Committee of the Cabinet (DOP) in May 1999;
•
weigh up
the prospects for sustaining that strategy;
•
assess the
likely attitudes of the possible new US Administrations;
and
•
consider the
issues that the UK would have to address with the
US.26
On 11
October, at No.10’s request, and in the context of
(unsubstantiated) reports that
Saddam
Hussein was seriously ill, the JIC assessed the prospects for Iraq
after Saddam’s
The JIC
stated that any new regime was unlikely to be radically different.
Strategic
considerations
and political, economic and commercial interests would produce
strong
pressure
for an early and widespread end to Iraq’s isolation. Iraq’s
political rehabilitation
could be
rapid, “overwhelming any voices of caution from London, Washington
or
elsewhere”.
25.
Mr Alan
Goulty, FCO Director Middle East and North Africa, sent a draft
discussion
paper,
entitled ‘Iraq: Future Strategy’, to Mr McKane on 20
October.28
26.
The draft
paper defined the UK’s objectives as “to limit Saddam’s ability
to
re‑arm and
develop WMD, and to reduce the threat Iraq poses to its
neighbours”. Full
implementation
of resolution 1284 remained the best means to achieve that, but
the
resolution’s
“shelf life” was limited. Without progress by summer 2001, it was
likely to
lose
credibility. If Iraq was to be persuaded to comply with the
resolution, it needed
to be
convinced that the resolution offered “something new” and that, if
it complied,
the UN
would suspend and eventually lift sanctions.
27.
The draft
paper stated that the US had been “reluctant to contemplate lifting
of
sanctions
as long as Saddam remains in power” and that there was a
“perception that
the US is
less than wholly committed to implementation of SCR 1284 and the
concept of
suspension
of sanctions, thus undermining the credibility of the
approach”.
25
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, page 21.
26
Letter
McKane to Goulty, 29 September 2000, ‘Iraq’.
27
JIC
Assessment, 11 October 2000, ‘Iraq After Saddam’.
28
Letter
Goulty to McKane, 20 October 2000, ‘Iraq’, attaching Paper [draft],
[undated], ‘Iraq: Future
Strategy’.
195