6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
768.
Adm Boyce
agreed with Gen Franks on 10 October that planning
should
proceed on
the assumption that Package 3 would be available.
769.
Adm Boyce
spoke to Gen Franks on 10 October, stressing that Package 2
was
“not an
insignificant contribution”.308
The option
of a UK operation in the South was being
looked at
if the northern option “fell away”.
770.
Gen Franks
observed that a deployment in the South would be “very
sequential
because of
the narrow entry front”.
771.
Adm Boyce told
Gen Franks that the way ahead on Package 3 was “too
close
to call”.
In relation to the difficulties that posed for US planning, Adm
Boyce was told
that it was
easier for the US to plan on having Package 3 rather than not
having it.
They agreed
that “interests would be best served” by planning on the assumption
that
Package 3
would be available.
772.
The
arguments in favour of offering Package 3 to the US and for
immediate
clarification
of the UK’s position were set out in advice for Mr Hoon,
agreed by
Adm Boyce,
on 11 October.
773.
The need for a
decision on the potential UK contribution to any US‑led
action
against
Iraq was set out in an urgent minute to Mr Hoon, from
Mr David Johnson, Head
of a newly
created Iraq Secretariat in the MOD,309
on 11
October.310
774.
Mr Hoon
was invited to note the increasing difficulty of maintaining the
feasibility of
Package 3
as long as its status was “unconfirmed”. He was asked to either
rule it out or
move it to
the same status as Package 2.
775.
Mr Johnson
told Mr Hoon that the US needed to know where the UK stood
very
soon:
“In
addition to pressure from US planners, it is in our interests to be
clearer about
our level
of engagement, against the background of a series of key planning
events
from
mid‑October onwards.”
776.
Mr Johnson
advised that the UN position was “a key element of the
continuing
strategic
uncertainty”. The UN inspections team was not expected to be fully
operational
before
mid‑February, but Iraqi non‑co‑operation “could occur at any
point”, including
a refusal
to accept the UN resolution. The “most likely scenario” was that
“potential
triggers
for military action” were “moving to the right” but, “both the need
to be
ready for
the worst case and the strategy of conflict prevention” pointed in
the same
direction:
“continuing and visible military preparations”. The main focus of
US planning
308
Minute
PSO/CDS to PS/SofS [MOD], 11 October 2002, ‘Record of a Discussion
Between CDS and
CINCCENT:
10 Oct 02’
309
Created on
30 September 2002.
310
Minute
Johnson to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 11 October 2002, ‘Iraq: UK
Contingency Planning’.
291