The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
in Baghdad)
are ahead of us on this, and are taking a much more open
stance”.311
He recommended
to Baroness Symons that she agree a “more open,
pro-active
approach”
to dealing with UK companies.
710.
Baroness
Symons sent that advice to Mr Straw and Ms Patricia Hewitt,
Secretary
of State
for Trade and Industry, stating that:
“… the
pressure from businesses is building and I fear that some of our
business
community
fear we are not engaged. Some think that the US and France are
ahead
of the game
already …”312
711.
Government
lobbying on behalf of UK firms is addressed in more detail
in
Section 10.3.
712.
The UK
‘Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi People’, written by the FCO in
October
2002, was
revised at the end of February 2003.
713.
Mr Straw
saw its principal value as a means to reassure domestic and
Iraqi
public
opinion of the UK’s intentions in Iraq.
714.
The
‘Vision’ was a statement of aspirations that assumed a level
of
agreement
with the US that did not yet exist on plans for post-conflict
Iraq.
715.
The ‘Vision
for Iraq and the Iraqi People’ was a separate document to the
‘UK
Vision for
Phase IV’, which is addressed earlier in this Section.
716.
On 27
February, Mr Straw discussed the draft ‘Vision for Iraq and
the Iraqi
People’,
originally prepared by FCO officials in October 2002 (see Section
6.4), with
Mr Campbell.313
The draft
had been shown to the AHGI on 11 October 2002, when it
had
been
decided that the paper should “remain in reserve”.314
717.
Mr Straw
believed that “public commitment on the lines of the draft could
have
a powerful
impact in Iraq and the region as well as on the British domestic
debate”.
The
‘Vision’ should not be launched or trailed until the UN had voted
on the second
resolution
because of the risk that it would be presented as “discounting” the
role of the
Security
Council. Care would also be needed to avoid confusing the message
that the
justification
for military action rested firmly on disarmament of
WMD.
718.
Mr Straw
thought it essential that the UK, US and “other Coalition members”
spoke
to a common
script. That underlined the importance of making progress with the
US on
311
Minute
Henderson to Symons, 27 February 2003, ‘Iraq contingency planning:
commercial aspects’.
312
Minute
Symons to Straw and Hewitt, undated, ‘Iraq: Commercial
Aspects’.
313
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 28 February 2003, ‘A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi
People’ attaching
Paper [unattributed
and undated], ‘A Vision for Iraq and the Iraqi
People’.
314
Minute Dodd
to Manning, 14 October 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’; Paper [draft]
FCO, [undated],
‘Vision for
Iraq and the Iraqi People’.
440