6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
The
dossier, Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the
British
Government, was
published on 24 September 2002.282
Both Houses
of Parliament were recalled from recess on 24 September 2002 to
debate
the case
for effective action in respect of the threat posed by
Iraq.
Mr Blair’s
statement to Parliament on the publication of the dossier on 24
September and
the
subsequent questions and answers lasted for 90
minutes.283
During his
statement, which focused on the history of Iraq’s weapons of mass
destruction
programme,
its breach of United Nations resolutions and its attempts to
rebuild that illegal
programme,
Mr Blair stated that “there must be genuine preparedness and
planning to
take
[military] action” if diplomacy failed.284
Mr Blair’s
statement was followed in the House of Commons by a nine‑hour
debate.
There was
also a debate in the House of Lords.
Mr Blair’s
statement and the debates in both Houses of Parliament are
described in
Section
3.5.
The content
of the dossier and Mr Blair’s statement are addressed in
Section 4.2.
717.
When the
Chiefs of Staff discussed Iraq planning on 25 September, Adm
Boyce
emphasised
that:
“…
expectation management with respect to UK caveats had to be taut.
Package 2
… was a
formidable contribution in its own right and Package 3, given its
importance
to the US,
was not just a ‘nice to have’.”285
718.
The Chiefs of
Staff also discussed the post‑conflict phase, “Phase IV”. It
was
recognised
that this Phase “would not have a clear‑cut start” and that we
should
“guard
against any accusation that the “US does the war‑fighting while the
UK does
the
peacekeeping”. Not being involved in Package 3 at all “would be
difficult to
manage”.
The Chiefs commissioned the SPG to “scope the issues within Phase
4”
(see Section 6.4).
719.
Mr Ehrman
reported that Adm Boyce had:
•
directed
that the Chiefs of Staff should meet every Wednesday to
discuss
Iraq; and
•
said that
it should be made clear to the US that they must deliver
Turkey.286
282
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002.
283
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24
September 2002, columns 1‑23.
284
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 24
September 2002, column 6.
285
Minutes, 25
September 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
286
Minute
Ehrman to Chaplin, 26 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Military
Planning’.
281