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6.1  |  Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq
Parliamentary debates, 24 September 2002
The dossier, Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, was published on 24 September 2002.282
Both Houses of Parliament were recalled from recess on 24 September 2002 to debate
the case for effective action in respect of the threat posed by Iraq.
Mr Blair’s statement to Parliament on the publication of the dossier on 24 September and
the subsequent questions and answers lasted for 90 minutes.283
During his statement, which focused on the history of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction
programme, its breach of United Nations resolutions and its attempts to rebuild that illegal
programme, Mr Blair stated that “there must be genuine preparedness and planning to
take [military] action” if diplomacy failed.284
Mr Blair’s statement was followed in the House of Commons by a nine‑hour debate.
There was also a debate in the House of Lords.
Mr Blair’s statement and the debates in both Houses of Parliament are described in
Section 3.5.
The content of the dossier and Mr Blair’s statement are addressed in Section 4.2.
CHIEFS OF STAFF MEETING, 25 SEPTEMBER 2002
717.  When the Chiefs of Staff discussed Iraq planning on 25 September, Adm Boyce
emphasised that:
“… expectation management with respect to UK caveats had to be taut. Package 2
… was a formidable contribution in its own right and Package 3, given its importance
to the US, was not just a ‘nice to have’.”285
718.  The Chiefs of Staff also discussed the post‑conflict phase, “Phase IV”. It was
recognised that this Phase “would not have a clear‑cut start” and that we should
“guard against any accusation that the “US does the war‑fighting while the UK does
the peacekeeping”. Not being involved in Package 3 at all “would be difficult to
manage”. The Chiefs commissioned the SPG to “scope the issues within Phase 4”
(see Section 6.4).
719.  Mr Ehrman reported that Adm Boyce had:
directed that the Chiefs of Staff should meet every Wednesday to discuss
Iraq; and
said that it should be made clear to the US that they must deliver Turkey.286
282 Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British Government, 24 September 2002.
283 House of Commons, Official Report, 24 September 2002, columns 1‑23.
284 House of Commons, Official Report, 24 September 2002, column 6.
285 Minutes, 25 September 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
286 Minute Ehrman to Chaplin, 26 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Military Planning’.
281
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