3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
•
Iraq
“seemed to be trying to find ways of assisting UNMOVIC” on
mobile
BW facilities.
•
Walls
“might contain eavesdropping devices, but even taking witnesses
to
Cyprus
might not necessarily guarantee truthful evidence”.
•
UNMOVIC
“could be expected to deal with the key remaining disarmament
tasks
in a matter
of months”. The timetable proposed in the draft resolution “could
not
conceivably
allow completion”.
•
Iraq was
“frantic” but “selective” in its co-operation.
•
A
“strategic decision” by Iraq to co-operate would be easily
recognised.
•
“Various
intelligence agencies were sure Iraq had retained ‘a jumpstart’
capacity,
but UNMOVIC
had seen no hard evidence.”
•
Not all the
evidence the inspectors had been given “was convincing, and
some
of it was
not even trustworthy”.
1162.
Dr ElBaradei
stated that the IAEA had nearly reached a satisfactory outcome
and
two to
three more months would lead to a conclusion. The test applied to
Iraq had to be
“an
objective results oriented one”.
1163.
Sir Jeremy
reported that initial reactions to the revised draft resolution
had
focused on
“the short time offered to Iraq to comply and on the
ultimatum”.
1164.
Following a
meeting between Mr Straw and Mr Tang, Sir Jeremy
Greenstock
reported
that China did not want a second resolution “now”; was concerned
about the
economic,
political and humanitarian consequences of a conflict; and the
consequences
for the UN
of a public split amongst the P5.349
1165.
Dr Blix
recorded that the US and UK had made pre-emptive use of
the
“clusters”
document before it was formally circulated after the Security
Council
meeting on
7 March.
1166.
Dr Blix
wrote that although the members of the Security Council knew of
the
existence
of the draft, they were not aware of its contents before finalised
copies of
the text
were presented on 7 March.350
The German
and Russian Foreign Ministers
had been:
“… keen
that it should become public to show that precise requirements
could be
placed on
Iraq, rather than nebulous demands for a ‘strategic decision’ or a
‘change
of heart’ …
neither the US nor the UK was opposed to a declassification of what
was
still an
internal document. As it turned out, both the US and the UK Foreign
Ministers
349
Telegram
379 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Foreign
Secretary’s Meeting
with Chinese
Foreign Minister, 7 March’.
350
Blix
H. The Search
for Weapons of Mass Destruction: Disarming Iraq. Bloomsbury
Publishing Plc, 2005.
391