6.2  |  Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

541.  The conclusions of the meeting on 6 March included:

• DFID and the MOD should draw up a plan for immediate humanitarian action

in the UK AO.

• Planning for a medium-term post-conflict action should continue on the

assumption that a UN mandate would be forthcoming.

• The FCO should prepare a Phase IV plan with other departments, including

the key decisions for Ministers to take.

• The Phase IV plan should cover sectorisation.

542.  The “UK overall plan for Phase IV” was shown to Mr Blair on 7 March.176 Much of

the plan, prepared by the IPU, was drawn from the Annotated Agenda prepared for the

meeting on 6 March.177 That is addressed in Section 6.5.

Commitment to military action

543.  On 7 March, Mr Lee sent Mr Hoon’s Private Office a “critical decision checklist”,

setting out the issues which needed to be resolved before forces could be committed

to action.178 Those included:

• legal authority for use of military force;

• Parliamentary approval;

• confirmation that the military plan was viable and the risks acceptable;

• agreement of host nations to conduct offensive operations from their territory;

• provision of resources for immediate humanitarian assistance;

• targeting policy and delegation;

• agreement with the US on Phase IV assumptions; and

• finalisation of military campaign objectives.

544.  Mr Lee asked No.10 to be notified using the checklist.

545.  Adm Boyce decided on 10 March that UK forces should focus on achieving

the UK objectives in its planned AO.

546.  The Chiefs of Staff were concerned that Lt Gen Reith’s recommendation to

allow operations further north would overstretch UK resources in both the combat

and post-combat phases.

547.  Lt Gen Reith sent the Chiefs of Staff an update on military planning options on

10 March.179 It reflected the undertaking (in Mr Watkins’ letter to Sir David Manning of

176  Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Weekend Papers’.

177  Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 7 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Weekend Papers’.

178  Minute Lee to PS/Secretary of State [MOD], 7 March 2003, ‘Critical Decision Checklist’.

179  Minute Reith to COSSEC, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq – Military Planning Options Update’ attaching

Paper CJO, 10 March 2003, ‘Iraq Military Planning Options – An Update’.

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