3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
240.
Mr Tony
Brenton, Chargé d’Affaires at the British Embassy Washington,
reported
that
concerns arising from the vote in the House of Commons the previous
day had
been a key
factor in achieving compromise.76
241.
President
Bush continued to determine the US position.
242.
Dr Rice
stated in her memoir that during the negotiations, she had
“run
interference”
for the State Department:
“… taking
up practically every controversy directly with the President rather
than
allowing
continued haggling among the various agencies. I know that caused
some
unhappiness
in Defense and within the Office of the Vice President, but the
process
was taking
long enough at the United Nations; we didn’t need to slow it down
with
divisions
within our own ranks.”77
243.
Mr Straw
wrote in his memoir:
“It was one
thing to have President Bush declare in favour of going to the
UN.
Turning his
twelve words about ‘necessary resolutions’ into a text that
could
command a
majority in the Security Council, and had teeth, was quite
another.
“The first
task was to pin down an acceptable draft. Inevitably parts of the
US
Government
weren’t bothered about securing a consensus in the Security
Council.
If the
other members of the Council supported it, fine; if they vetoed it,
fine too …
The early
drafts from the US were unacceptable to us. To resolve this we
organised
a six‑way
conference call … We made good progress, but there were still
some
outstanding
issues, which could only be resolved by Tony talking to the
President.”78
244.
Lord
Goldsmith, the Attorney General, confirmed that he was satisfied
with
the
arrangements for the exchange of information with FCO Legal
Advisers when
he and
Mr Straw discussed the position on 23 September.
245.
A meeting
between Lord Goldsmith and Mr Straw took place on 23
September.79
246.
Mr Simon
McDonald recorded that:
“Lord
Goldsmith said he admired what the Prime Minister and Foreign
Secretary
had
achieved in persuading the US back to the UN route … he would have
to see
the final
shape of any resolution. Too much emphasis on a second resolution
would
cause him
problems (about whether or not the first resolution allowed the use
of
force …).
It seemed to him unarguable that [the threat] of force had got
Saddam
Hussein to
move.
76
Letter
Brenton to McDonald, 25 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Security Council
Resolution’.
77
Rice
C. No Higher
Honour: A Memoir of My Years in Washington. Simon
& Schuster, 2011.
78
Straw
J. Last Man
Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan,
2012.
79
Minute
McDonald to Legal Adviser, 24 September 2002, ‘Attorney
General’.
245