1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
actions
taken without the Council’s authorisation”, severely damaged the
status and
authority
of the Council and complicated the situation.
829.
Mr Qin
Huasun concluded by calling for an end to the NFZs, which flew “in
the
face of
international law and the authority of the Council”.
830.
Mr Dejammet
stated that France had observed in January 1999 that the top
priority
was the
restoration of security and stability with the “long-term presence
on the ground
of
professional inspectors” to prevent the arming of Iraq and ensuring
that sanctions did
not punish
the Iraqi population. The Council had agreed that the “relationship
between
Iraq and
the United Nations needed to be set on a new footing”.
831.
Mr Dejammet
stated that the draft resolution called upon Iraq “to accept
the
return of
the inspectors without knowing what arrangement will exist in the
period
after
suspension”. If the interpretations of the text diverged, the
Chairman of the new
Commission
would not be able to carry out his mandate and it was not clear how
the
Council
would be able to reach a decision on when sanctions should be
suspended.
832.
Mr Burleigh
stated that the resolution did not raise the bar on what was
required
of Iraq on
disarmament, but nor did it lower it. There was no lack of clarity
about the
sequence of
events, Iraq’s compliance “must precede all else”. Identifying the
“key
remaining
disarmament tasks” needed to be addressed. If Iraq fulfilled those
tasks
and met
the requirements in the resolution:
“… the
Council, including the United States, can decide whether to
recognize that
co-operation
and compliance by suspending sanctions.
“Similarly,
if Iraq meets the full range of obligations … the Council can
make
a decision
regarding the lifting of sanctions.”
833.
Mr Burleigh
added that the US was “not seeking an excuse to use force”, but
Iraq
held the
key. The US had “no illusion that the Iraqi regime” was “likely to
change its
spots”.
Compliance was “highly unlikely” while Saddam Hussein remained in
power.
834.
Mr Burleigh
also stated that, before sanctions could be suspended, there
would
be a need
to decide the exact terms for lifting prohibitions to “prevent any
revenues
from being
diverted for prohibited purposes” and “effective control measures”
for civilian
imports
into Iraq were of the “utmost importance”.
835.
Mr Jassim
Mohammed Buallay, Bahraini Permanent Representative to
the
UN, drew
attention to the fact that Iraq “had already declared its total
rejection of
the resolution”.
836.
Mr Peter
van Walsum, Dutch Permanent Representative to the UN, said
that
the
statements of the Iraqi authorities gave no indication that they
would be prepared
to
co-operate “other than on the basis of an unconditional lifting of
the sanctions, and
no member
of the Council has shown any readiness to meet that condition”. He
also
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