The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
117.
Mr Cook
subsequently told Secretary Powell that he had suggested to Mr
Vedrine
that: “The
aim should be to establish a common front between the Iraqi people
and the
118.
Section 1.1
addresses the legal basis advanced by the UK for the creation
and
continued
operation of the NFZs in northern and southern Iraq, and for the
response to
Iraqi
attacks on aircraft enforcing the NFZs.
119.
Operations in
the NFZs and the targets which UK aircraft were permitted to
attack
were
regularly reviewed and approved by Ministers.
The
coalition established NFZs in the north and south of Iraq in 1991
and 1992
respectively
(see Section 1.1).
With the
agreement of Ministers, operational commanders were allowed
discretion to
respond in
self-defence within the parameters of a number of graduated
“Response
Options”
(ROs) defined as:
•
RO1 –
immediate self-defence. An aircraft in the air responding
immediately to an
Iraqi
threat to it, or to another coalition asset, although not
necessarily against the
specific
system directly causing the threat.
•
RO2 – a
coalition response against a pre-planned target to a threat during
the
course of a
subsequent patrol on the same day.
•
RO3 – a
coalition response against a pre-planned target on the
next
ROs 1 to 3
were dependent on there being a “triggering threat” in the form of
a weapon
fired or a
radar illumination.
•
RO5 –
pre-emptive self-defence on the basis of demonstrated Iraqi hostile
intent,
such as a
pre-emptive operation against mobile surface-to-air missile
(SAM)
assets. RO5
was introduced to counter Iraqi tactics of threatening coalition
aircraft
and then
moving assets before coalition aircraft could respond.
Any
proposal to carry out an attack that did not fall within the
parameters defined within
ROs 1 to 3
and RO5 was classified RO4 and required Ministerial
approval.
The agreed
rules placed a limit on the number of targets that could be
attacked in any
single
response (six); and on the number of attacks that could be carried
out within any
seven-day
period (four).
From
November 2000, the UK Commander was not authorised to commit to an
RO attack
where
civilian casualties were expected.69
By March
2001, UK forces no longer relied on
delegated
authority in cases where the risk of collateral damage to civilian
buildings was
considered
higher than “low”.70
67
Telegram 69
FCO London to Washington, 12 February 2001, ‘Foreign Secretary’s
Telephone
Conversation
with Secretary Powell, 11 February’.
68
Email
SEC(O)1-S to PS/Hd of MoDLA-S, 9 July 2001, ‘ROs’.
69
Letter
Hemming to Brummell, 19 December 2001, ‘Iraq NFZs: Response Option
Triggers’.
70
Letter
Hemming to Berman, 6 March 2001, ‘Iraq – RO5 Target’.
212