10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
343.
Mr Rycroft
sent Mr Blair the DFID Interim Strategy, Mr O’Brien’s and
Mr Chilcott’s
reports
from Iraq, and an IPU update on ORHA on 2 May.191
Mr Rycroft
commented:
“… ORHA is
not yet up to the job. It has no effective management. There is
no
clear
understanding of who is making policy … A State Department
Ambassador,
Bremmer
[sic], is due to take over from Jay Garner.
“UK input
remains insufficient. But Whitehall has at last got your message
that we
need to
send good people into all bits of ORHA …”
344.
Mr Rycroft
identified some immediate points for Mr Blair’s
attention:
•
The FCO was
appointing Mr John Sawers to work “in or very closely
with”
ORHA.
•
The UK
would seek to persuade the US to keep ORHA for the short term,
before
handing
over to the IIA and a UN-led mission to support the
IIA.
•
ORHA should
“get the Iraqi ministries operating again, and improve their
media
work so
that improvements in infrastructure are visible”.
•
ORHA should
develop a plan for SSR.
345.
Mr Blair
indicated that he agreed with those points. He commented: “I want
to hear
from Tim
Cross that his concerns are being met next week”.192
346.
Mr Rycroft
informed the FCO on 6 May that Mr Blair remained concerned
that
ORHA lacked
proper management, but welcomed the increase in UK
support.193
Mr Rycroft
asked for further advice by 9 May on the UK’s contribution to ORHA,
ORHA’s
internal
management and priorities, and an assessment of whether Maj Gen
Cross’s
concerns
were now being met.
347.
Mr Sawers
arrived in Baghdad on 7 May.194
348.
The FCO
advised No.10 on 9 May that good progress had been made in
stepping
up UK
military and civilian support for ORHA.195
So far, 34
public sector volunteers had
completed
pre-deployment training; 11 more would be trained the following
week.
A first
batch of 22 was scheduled to leave for Iraq on 13 May with a
similar-sized group
to follow a
week later. The key to ORHA’s success would be achieving results
with
the Iraqi
ministries in Baghdad; support for that work would be the UK’s
“main effort”,
although it
would also provide 10 secondees to ORHA(South). The FCO reported
that
officials
were in daily contact with Maj Gen Cross, who was content with “the
current
state of
play”.
191
Minute
Rycroft to Prime Minister, 2 May 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA’.
192
Manuscript
comment Blair on Minute Rycroft to Prime Minister, 2 May 2003,
‘Iraq: ORHA’.
193
Letter
Rycroft to Owen, 6 May 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA’.
194
Telegram 2
IraqRep to FCO London, 11 May 2003, ‘Personal: Iraq: What’s Going
Wrong?’.
195
Letter Owen
to Rycroft, 9 May 2003, ‘Iraq: ORHA’.
63