3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
•
whether the
real reason for a military conflict was access to oil and oil
contracts;
•
the desire for
a vote in the House of Commons before any commitment of
UK
forces to
Iraq;
•
the extent of
the UK’s influence on the US, and the importance to the UK
of
maintaining
its relationship with the US;
•
the
implications of Saddam Hussein’s human rights record;
•
preparations
for a post‑Saddam Iraq and the need for an “exit
strategy”;
•
implications
of a potential conflict for the Middle East as a
whole;
•
whether the UK
had sufficient military manpower for the task, and the
protection
of those
deployed;
•
the potential
use Diego Garcia;
•
Saddam
Hussein’s willingness to use WMD;
•
US and UK
roles in supplying arms to Iraq;
•
whether the
international community should concentrate on Afghanistan
where
there was
still much to do;
•
implications
of the dossier and of military action for the threat from
international
terrorism;
and
•
whether public
opinion would support military action.
A number of
MPs also protested that the debate should have been held much
earlier.
217.
In his speech
closing the debate, Mr Adam Ingram, the Minister of State
for
Defence,
set out “two critical questions” which Mr Blair and
Mr Straw had said had to be
addressed:
•
Had the
threat from Saddam Hussein increased?
•
Should
action be taken to address that threat and, if so, what
action?
218.
Mr Ingram
stated that the dossier demonstrated:
•
There was
“significant evidence” that Saddam Hussein had “brazenly
flouted”
UN
resolutions “to which he had agreed to adhere”.
•
Saddam
Hussein had:
{{“continued to
produce chemical and biological weapons”;
{{“tried
covertly to acquire technology and materials that could be used in
the
production
of nuclear weapons”;
{{“sought
significant quantities of uranium from Africa”;
{{“recalled
specialists to work on his nuclear programme”;
{{“commenced a
comprehensive weapons development programme across
a range of
capabilities to deliver his future and current weapons of
mass
destruction”;
and
{{“already
begun to conceal sensitive equipment and documentation
in
advance of
the inspectors’ return”.
239