The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
267.
Mr Powell
proposed “Public Lines” comprising:
“Iraq a
threat because of WMD capabilities and support of terrorist groups
(do not
try to
link it to Al Qaida – war is on all international terrorism not
just AQ and there is
no
convincing proof of AQ involvement with Iraq).
“Demand
return of inspectors so can verify dismantling of WMD facilities.
Seek
UN
resolution.
“If no
return of inspectors will consider what further action
…
“Our duty
to support rising … Cannot allow him to use terrorism against his
own
people once
again. Just like Bosnia or Kosovo international community cannot
stand
by and
watch genocide.”
268.
Asked about
the ideas being considered in late 2001, Mr Powell told the
Inquiry:
“… we
didn’t really have a serious discussion of proposals at that stage,
or we
weren’t
clear, and I jotted down some ideas on a piece of paper which I
would rather
forget at
the moment, about encouraging people in Iraq to resist, Shi’ites,
Sunnis
and
military leaders.”135
269.
Asked whether
that was an Afghanistan sort of model, Mr Powell
replied:
“Yes, it
was … but it wasn’t a very serious piece of work and it didn’t go
anywhere.
The Prime
Minister did me the good grace of not commenting on
it.”
270.
Throughout the
autumn, as Sir David Manning told Dr Rice on 28 November,
the
UK had been
thinking about the next steps in countering international
terrorism.
271.
A FCO minute
written in mid-November explained that a counter-terrorism
strategy
had been
developed following extensive inter-departmental discussion, which
identified
the
objectives needed “to defeat UBL and his networks”.136
It had
“evolved from an
initial MOD
desire to fit the current military action in Afghanistan into a
wider strategy”.
The
intention was to draw up “country strategies” to guide efforts in
the months ahead.
272.
Iraq was
identified as one of more than a dozen countries “which would seem
to
merit
particular attention”.
273.
Following
President Bush’s remarks to the press on 26 November
2001,
the FCO
considered the legality of military action against Iraq in November
2001.
135
Public
hearing, 18 January 2010, page 30.
136
Minute
Bloomfield to PS [FCO], 13 November 2001, ‘Counter-Terrorism
Strategy: Phase Two’.
358