1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
•
The
agreement that missiles should be analysed outside Iraq, in
response to
Mr Ekéus’s
“allegations” in 1996 “that Iraq might retain an operational
missile
force”, had
not provided any results.
•
Iraq had
allowed access to 40 of the 43 sites designated for inspection
and
its actions
“cannot be interpreted as a decision by the Government of Iraq
to
prevent the
Special Commission implementing its mandate”.
•
Col
Ritter’s aim in gaining access to designated sites was “to achieve
other
purposes,
unrelated to the Special Commission’s mandate”.
303.
On
21 June, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution
1115 (1997),
condemning
Iraq’s actions and demanding its full co-operation. Although the
resolution
was adopted
unanimously, there were clear differences between the positions of
the US
and UK, and
China and Russia.
304.
Acting under
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, in resolution 1115 the
Security
Council
condemned the “repeated refusal of the Iraqi authorities to allow
access to sites
designated
by the Special Commission”, which constituted a “clear and flagrant
violation”
of the
provisions of previous resolutions. The Council reiterated its the
demands for
Iraq to:
•
“co-operate
fully”;
•
allow
“immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access” for the
inspectors; and
•
“give
immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access” to officials whom
the
Special
Commission wished to interview.
305.
The resolution
requested the Chairman of UNSCOM to include “an annex
evaluating
Iraq’s compliance” with those requirements in his future reports
to
the Council.
306.
The resolution
expressed the Council’s “firm intention … to impose
additional
measures”
on the officials responsible if Iraq did not comply.
307.
In a statement
before the vote, Sir John Weston, the UK Permanent
Representative
to the UN in New York, stated that the Council was meeting “to
respond
to the
latest in a series of incidents” in which the Iraqi authorities had
“sought to
impose
conditions”, which he described as an “Iraqi campaign to prevent
the Special
Commission
carrying out the mandate given to it by this Council” which was
“obviously
directed
from the highest levels in Baghdad”.133
308.
Sir John added
that it was “simply incredible for Iraq to claim that this
campaign
of
concealment was the work of the late Hussein Kamil and a few
associates”. It was
“essential”
that the “mechanism of deception and concealment” was:
133
UN Security
Council, ‘3792nd Meeting Saturday 21 June 1997’
(S/PV.3792).
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