10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
UN have
moved fast to design programmes … Although other donors
have
committed
money, little has been paid in. We ought to show leadership by
putting our
money in
soon.”
The UK
transferred £40m to the World Bank Trust Fund and £30m to the UN
Trust Fund at
948.
The Annotated
Agenda for the 1 March meeting of the AHMGIR stated
that
modified
versions of the Development Fund for Iraq (DFI) and International
Advisory
and
Monitoring Board (IAMB) should be retained after the transition, in
order to
“ensure
accountability and transparency”.556
Otherwise,
there was a substantial risk of
mismanagement
of oil revenues. The arrangement could also ensure that Iraqi
assets
remained
immune from claims. The US supported the idea of a modified
DFI.
949.
Such an
arrangement might be seen in Iraq as a constraint on sovereignty,
but
conversely
many Iraqis might welcome arrangements which enhanced transparency
and
restricted
the ability of transitional Ministers to mismanage oil
revenues.
950.
The Annotated
Agenda also stated that the DFI currently held US$8.8bn and
paid
for 95
percent of the Iraqi budget. In addition, “substantial DFI funds
had been spent
off‑budget
on the approval of the CPA with intermittent Iraqi
representation”.
951.
The Annotated
Agenda did not contain any further detail on the
“off-budget”
disbursement
of DFI funds.
952.
The AHMGIR
agreed that the UK should press for the establishment of
transparent
and
accountable arrangements for the management of oil and other Iraqi
revenues
through the
transition period.557
953.
Sir Jon
Cunliffe told the Inquiry that, although the US and the CPA were
“very
resistant
to external monitoring and external accountability” undertaken by
the IAMB:
“When the
Iraqi Government itself arrived, I think both Occupying Powers
decided
there was
joint interest in having transparency, accountability and control
[over oil
revenues]
and, indeed, I think that the US were with us in pushing for the
interim
Iraqi
Government to take on the DFI with all of its monitoring
machinery.”558
954.
Section 10.3
describes the operation of the DFI, and considers the UK’s
scrutiny
of disbursements
from the DFI.
955.
The
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL), which defined the transition
to a fully
sovereign
Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) by 30 June 2004 and an Iraqi
Transitional
555
Paper DFID,
4 November 2009, ‘Iraq – DFID Timeline and Financial Commitments:
2003-2009’.
556 Annotated
Agenda, 1 March 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
557
Minutes, 1
March 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
558
Public
hearing, 9 July 2010, pages 38 and 39.
165