9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
•
contributes
positively to stable world energy markets by maximising its
potential
as a
producer and exporter of oil and gas, and increases EU energy
security
through
developing new supply routes.”
328.
In order to
achieve these objectives, the paper suggested that it was essential
that
Iraq should
remain a single entity; be capable of representing and serving the
interests
of all its
communities effectively; be able to defend its own borders and
maintain internal
and
external security; and have a functioning economy, which would
require agreement
on the
Hydrocarbons Law.
329.
It was also
highly desirable that Iraq should be “a broadly democratic state”,
should
address
critical humanitarian issues (in particular the large number of
refugees and
displaced
people) and should develop a strong and open market
economy.
330.
The main
strategic risk identified was “the inability of the Iraqi
leadership and
parties to
rise above sectarian or partisan motivations and work in the
interest of the
whole of
Iraq”. The main operational risk was the security situation, which
remained
“inimical
to normal civilian operations”, so keeping the cost of operating in
Iraq high.
331.
An annex to
the main paper described further “problem areas”,
including:
“Fundamental
questions about Iraq’s future have not yet been settled. There
is
still no
broad agreement between a critical mass of Iraqi actors on the
extent
of
centralism versus devolution (both economic and political); the
nature of the
relationships
between Sunni and Shia, and between Arabs and Kurd … In
addition,
serious
doubts remain about the willingness and ability of Iraqi leaders to
effect
reconciliation
between Iraq’s main communities and encourage an inclusive and
fair
political
process.”
332.
The strategy
paper set out the elements of the future relationship, in
broadly
similar
terms to those identified in the Cabinet Office paper for NSID. The
main
difference
was the specific addition of counter-terrorism and the processing
of voluntary
and
compulsory returns of migrants to Iraq, including the Kurdish
Region. The paper
stated that:
“The UK …
are no longer in a position to dictate political, economic and
security
outcomes in
Iraq … however, we have a clear interest in these outcomes insofar
as
they affect
Iraq’s security, stability, prosperity and governance. We therefore
need
to remain
politically engaged and seek to maximise our influence over Iraqi
choices
on issues
such as reconciliation, energy sector development and Kirkuk which
are
fundamental
to the future nature of the Iraqi state. This will only be possible
if the
Iraqis
believe we take the relationship seriously …
“UK
assistance to Iraq should increasingly aim to support the Iraqis in
ways they find
useful and
persuade them to leverage their own resources … Elements of
training
and
capacity-building assistance can continue to be offered outside
Iraq. But overall,
435