The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
program
management; coordinate with Coalition military and
non-governmental
organizations;
and advise local government ministry officials …
“You will
report to me through the [CPA] Director of Operations and
Infrastructure
for
operational matters and through the [CPA] Director of Governance
for political
issues. You
may draw on the Regional Coordinators and CPA staffs as needed
for
technical
program and support.” 418
760.
On 1 October,
Sir Jeremy Greenstock commented to London that those lines
of
command
were “complex”.419
He also
confirmed that his office had agreed with CPA
officials
that the UK would deploy personnel into the CPA’s GTs only when Sir
Jeremy,
the FCO and
DFID were satisfied that appropriate security measures were in
place. In
practice,
that meant that, until additional security measures were in place,
all UK staff
would be
deployed to Wasit, Tamim and the four Governorates in
CPA(South).
761.
In a briefing
note to all staff on the role and purpose of CPA(South),
dated
12 November,
Sir Hilary Synnott described the relationship between the
Governorate
Teams,
Baghdad and CPA(South) as “complicated”, though he saw “no reason
why they
should not
become workable and mutually advantageous”.420
He added
that “difficulties
in the
relationship between the Governorate Teams and the regional centre
pale into
insignificance
beside those in mastering what is going on in
Baghdad”.
762.
The UK
Government has not been able to provide the Inquiry with
precise
figures for
UK personnel deployed to the GTs. A contact list for UK personnel
in Iraq
on 30
December 2003 showed 48 UK personnel (including close protection
teams)
deployed to
GTs across Iraq, 36 of them in the four southern governorates of
Basra,
Dhi Qar,
Maysan and Muthanna, the others to Wasit and
Kirkuk.421
Figures for
each
Team
were:
•
Basra 22
(including a close protection team);
•
Dhi Qar
4;
•
Maysan 10
(including a close protection team and Deputy
Governorate
Co-ordinator,
Mr Rory Stewart, who served as acting Governorate
Co-ordinator
between
September and November); 422
•
Muthanna
1;
•
Wasit
4;
418
Minute
Coalition Provisional Authority Baghdad, 25 September 2003,
‘Letters of Authorization for
Governorate
Coordinators’ attaching Letter Bremer, 25 September 2003,
‘Governorate Coordinator
Appointment’.
419
Telegram
191 IraqRep to FCO London, 1 October 2003, ‘UK Governorate
Manning’.
420
Paper
Synnott, 12 November 2003, ‘CPA (South): Its Role and Purpose’,
reproduced in Synnott H.
Bad Days in
Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern
Iraq. I B Tauris
& Co Ltd., 2008.
421
Paper
[unattributed], 12 January 2004, ‘UK Personnel Deployed (As at 30
Dec 03)’.
422
Stewart
R. Occupational
Hazards. Picador,
2006.
132