The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
101.
As the
detailed analysis in Section 4.1 shows, the assumption that
Saddam Hussein
had
retained some WMD and the ability to use it and that he was now
actively seeking
to enhance
those capabilities, despite the disarmament obligations imposed by
the UN
Security
Council after the Gulf Conflict in 1991, was deeply embedded in UK
thinking by
March
2002.
102.
That was
reinforced by the JIC Current Intelligence Group (CIG) Assessment
of the
status of
Iraq’s WMD programmes issued on 15 March to aid policy discussions
on Iraq.53
103.
In the context
of a discussion about US concerns, relating to Al Qaida’s
pursuit
of WMD, the
need for action to deal with the threat posed by Iraq and the
potential link
between
terrorism and WMD, Mr Blair told Vice President Dick Cheney on
11 March that
it was
“highly desirable to get rid of Saddam” and that the “UK would
help” the US “as
long as
there was a clever strategy”.54
104.
Policy
discussions with the US during March, including Mr Blair’s
discussion with
Vice
President Cheney and Sir David Manning’s visit to Washington,
are addressed in
Section
3.2.
105.
Mr Hoon
discussed Mr Webb’s advice of 27 February at a meeting on 19
March,
at which
AM French “and others” were present.55
106.
In relation to
the options for military action, Mr Hoon was advised that, if
a UK
contribution
to US military action against Iraq were to be sought,
it:
“… might be
a ‘division minus’, ie the largest of the options [for the
deployment of
UK ground
forces] foreseen in the SDR [1998 Strategic Defence
Review].”56
107.
Mr Hoon
was also told that a “key issue would be the size of any continuing
military
presence
required to sustain a post‑Saddam regime”.
108.
Mr Hoon
requested advice on the “likely resilience of Iraq’s resistance to
a ground
operation”.
109.
Mr Hoon
concluded that, if the US were to pursue a military option and
seek
UK
involvement, “it would clearly be undesirable” for the UK to find
itself “facing a
plan about
which we had reservations”. It would, therefore, be “advantageous
to seek
representation
in the UN planning process”. He would write to Mr Blair
suggesting he
should
raise that possibility in his discussions with President
Bush.
53
CIG
Assessment, 15 March 2002, ‘The Status of Iraqi WMD
Programmes’.
54
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 11 March 2002, ‘Conversation between the Prime
Minister and Vice
President
Cheney, 11 March 2002’.
55
Minute
Watkins to Policy Director, 20 March 2002, ‘Axis of
Evil’.
56
The
Planning Assumptions, agreed in SDR 1998 and described earlier in
this Section, stated that the
UK should
be able to deploy a division of up to three brigades in response to
crises outside the NATO
area.
During the Gulf Conflict in 1991, the UK deployed an armoured
division comprising two combat
brigades; 4
Brigade and 7 Armoured Brigade (Ministry of Defence,
Statement
on the Defence Estimates –
Britain’s
Defence for the 90s, July 1991,
Cm 1559).
192