The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
because it
reflected the rapidly moving situation in Iraq. The Inquiry does
not agree with
that
analysis. A shared understanding of what sort of police force was
required in Iraq
and how it
could be delivered was essential to ensuring that SSR resources
were used
effectively
and coherently.
29.
The AHMGIR
identified the requirement for approximately 7,000 international
police
officers –
of which it was intended that the UK would provide 100 – as
“ambitious” but
did not
commission further work to understand the impact on CPA plans if
the total could
not be
reached.
30.
In August, UND
asked DCC Brand to lobby the US for the creation of a
policing
strategy
for Iraq. There was no established UK policy position at that point
on what sort
of police
force was appropriate for Iraq, the role of an Iraqi police
officer, the ideal force
structure,
or how police reform should be delivered. That hampered DCC Brand’s
ability
to
influence US strategy.
31.
Mr Kerik
estimated in early August that Iraq would need 65,000‑75,000
police
officers
and that it would take six years to develop a force of that size.
There was no
Coalition
plan to deliver that number of officers.
32.
By the end of
August, the CPA’s plans for a 7,000‑strong international training
force
were
recognised to be unachievable. The aspiration was now “1,500 to
2,000” officers.16
33.
A policing
strategy for Iraq was also essential to ensure that the
international effort
was
coherent across the country. The lack of co‑ordination between
police reform in
Baghdad and
Basra could be seen in a report produced by DCC White on 26
August.
He assessed
that 91 international officers would be required to support the
policing
mission in
Multi‑National Division (South‑East) (MND(SE)) and an additional 48
would
be required
to provide force protection. DCC White told the Inquiry that that
caused
some
controversy when the numbers were communicated to the CPA staff in
Baghdad
as they
were considered to be inconsistent with the new ‘MOI 60/90 day
Strategic Plan’
which DCC
White had not seen.
34.
In the absence
of a clear strategy for what type of force was needed, and a
realistic
assessment
of how it could be delivered, priority was given to pushing Iraqi
police
officers
through basic training in large numbers.
Mr Stephen
Pattison, Head of UND until June 2003, told the Inquiry that the
process of
recruiting
officers to deploy overseas was “always a struggle”17
and “not
straightforward”.
The
requirement was often for armed police which ruled out the majority
of UK officers.
16
Minute
Brand, 10 August 2003, ‘Report from Iraq – Douglas
Brand’.
17
Statement,
6 January 2011, pages 12‑13.
420