The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Mr Pahad
added that the initiative gave Iraq “the possibility of a
face-saving climb-down …
if Saddam
seriously rushed to comply”.
The British
High Commission commented that Mr Pahad was “cautiously
optimistic that
South
Africa might be able to help resolve the current stand-off in
Iraq”, but was “realistic
about the
obstacles” that remained.
638.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told Dr Blix that the Security Council had to
realise
that if it
was not willing to authorise force if Iraq did not disarm, the
issue would
be taken
out of its hands.
639.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock told Dr Blix on 19 February that the UK was likely
to go
for an
approach “signalling the end game on Iraq”.177
The UK
“would say that the Council
had to
realise that this would be out of the hands of the UN unless it
decided that Iraq
had to
start the process of real disarmament and was willing to authorise
force if it did
not”. The
UK “still hoped to avert the use of force – but we had to be
realistic”.
640.
Sir Jeremy
reported that Dr Blix was not averse to a deadline but 15
March was
“not
theoretically doable”. He concluded that the “Blix benchmark
possibilities” had been
“tested”
and “set aside as too risky”.
641.
Sir Jeremy
also reported that Dr Blix had said he would issue a decision
on
missiles to
Iraq within 24 hours; and that UNMOVIC had “just received an
‘amazingly’
detailed
document on the persons involved in the destruction of biological
weapons
which could
be significant”. The meeting of the College of Commissioners for
UNMOVIC
on 24 and
25 February would discuss the “clusters” document. Dr Blix
expected it to be
finalised
by 3 March, but he did not intend to submit it to the Security
Council; it “was
an exercise
to help UNMOVIC define the key remaining disarmament tasks due
under
1284 – but
would do so if asked”.
642.
Sir Jeremy
commented that the UK was “likely to say that, if Iraq did not
rapidly
demonstrate
it was engaging in voluntary disarmament, this document was
academic”.
643.
Mr Blair
told Dr Blix that he wanted to offer the US an alternative
strategy
which
included a deadline and tests for compliance. He did not think
Saddam
would
co-operate but he would try to get Dr Blix as much time as
possible.
644.
Dr Blix
stated that full co-operation was a nebulous concept; and a
deadline
of 15 April
would be too early.
645.
Mr Blair
telephoned Dr Blix on 20 February.178
They spoke for
45 minutes.
177
Telegram
287 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: 19
February’.
178
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Blix’.
294